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Ideal	  Rationality	  and	  Logical	  Omniscience	  	  Does	  rationality	  require	  logical	  omniscience?	  Our	  best	  formal	  theories	  of	  rationality	  imply	  that	  it	  does,	  but	  our	  ordinary	  evaluations	  of	  rationality	  seem	  to	  suggest	  otherwise.	  This	  paper	  aims	  to	  resolve	  the	  tension	  by	  arguing	  that	  our	  ordinary	  evaluations	  of	  rationality	  are	  not	  only	  consistent	  with	  the	  thesis	  that	  rationality	  requires	  logical	  omniscience,	  but	  also	  provide	  a	  compelling	  rationale	  for	  accepting	  this	  thesis	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  This	  paper	  defends	  an	  account	  of	  apriori	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  about	  logic	  that	  is	  designed	  to	  explain	  the	  thesis	  that	  rationality	  requires	  logical	  omniscience.	  On	  this	  account,	  apriori	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  about	  logic	  has	  its	  source	  in	  logical	  
facts,	  rather	  than	  psychological	  facts	  about	  experience,	  reasoning,	  or	  understanding.	  The	  proposal	  is	  that	  logical	  truths	  provide	  sources	  of	  apriori	  justification	  to	  believe	  those	  truths	  that	  is	  indubitable,	  infallible,	  and	  indefeasible.	  This	  account	  is	  designed	  to	  explain	  why	  rationality	  requires	  logical	  omniscience.	  This	  account	  has	  important	  consequences	  for	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  experience	  in	  the	  logical	  domain.	  On	  this	  account,	  experience	  is	  not	  a	  source	  of	  apriori	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  about	  logic,	  although	  it	  can	  enable	  one	  to	  use	  apriori	  justification	  that	  one	  already	  has	  in	  forming	  justified	  beliefs	  about	  logic.	  Similarly,	  experience	  is	  not	  a	  source	  of	  evidence	  that	  defeats	  apriori	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  about	  logic,	  although	  it	  can	  disable	  one	  from	  using	  apriori	  justification	  in	  forming	  justified	  beliefs.	  In	  a	  slogan,	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  experience	  in	  the	  apriori	  domain	  is	  not	  a	  justifying	  role,	  but	  rather	  an	  enabling	  and	  disabling	  role.	  As	  I	  will	  explain,	  this	  account	  has	  consequences	  for	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  current	  issues	  in	  epistemology,	  including	  the	  connection	  between	  justification	  and	  truth,	  the	  nature	  of	  epistemic	  idealization,	  the	  relationship	  between	  propositional	  and	  doxastic	  justification,	  the	  function	  of	  higher-­‐order	  evidence	  of	  one’s	  cognitive	  imperfection,	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  rational	  dilemmas.	  Here	  is	  the	  plan	  for	  the	  paper.	  Sections	  1	  &	  2	  explain	  and	  motivate	  the	  thesis	  that	  rationality	  requires	  logical	  omniscience.	  Section	  3	  proposes	  an	  account	  of	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apriori	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  about	  logic	  that	  explains	  this	  rational	  requirement.	  Sections	  4	  &	  5	  respond	  to	  objections	  by	  drawing	  a	  distinction	  between	  ideal	  and	  non-­‐ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality.	  Sections	  6	  &	  7	  develop	  an	  account	  of	  the	  enabling	  and	  disabling	  role	  of	  experience	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  logic.	  Sections	  8	  &	  9	  explore	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  account	  for	  the	  structure	  of	  ideal	  rationality.	  Section	  10	  concludes	  with	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  main	  claims	  of	  the	  paper.	  	  
1. Probabilistic	  Coherence	  A	  defining	  feature	  of	  probabilistic	  theories	  of	  rationality	  is	  the	  requirement	  that	  one’s	  credences,	  or	  degrees	  of	  confidence,	  must	  be	  probabilistically	  coherent	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  conform	  to	  the	  axioms	  of	  the	  probability	  calculus:	  	   (1) For	  every	  P,	  pr	  (P)	  ≥	  0.	  (2) If	  P	  is	  a	  tautology	  [i.e.	  a	  necessary	  truth],	  then	  pr	  (P)	  =	  1.	  (3) If	  P	  and	  Q	  are	  mutually	  exclusive,	  then	  pr	  (P	  v	  Q)	  =	  pr	  (P)	  +	  pr	  (Q).1	  	  The	  assumption	  is	  that	  the	  credences	  of	  a	  rational	  agent	  can	  be	  represented	  by	  means	  of	  a	  probability	  function	  that	  assigns	  a	  real	  number	  in	  the	  unit	  interval	  between	  0	  and	  1	  to	  every	  set	  of	  points	  in	  a	  probability	  space.	  An	  agent’s	  credence	  in	  a	  proposition	  is	  given	  by	  the	  number	  assigned	  by	  the	  probability	  function	  to	  the	  set	  of	  points	  in	  the	  probability	  space	  in	  which	  the	  proposition	  is	  true.	  If	  one	  is	  certain	  that	  a	  proposition	  is	  true,	  then	  its	  probability	  is	  1;	  if	  one	  is	  certain	  that	  it	  is	  false,	  then	  its	  probability	  is	  0;	  and	  if	  one	  has	  some	  intermediate	  degree	  of	  confidence	  that	  it	  is	  true,	  then	  its	  probability	  is	  intermediate	  between	  0	  and	  1.	  Probabilistic	  coherence	  entails	  that	  one	  is	  certain	  of	  all	  necessary	  truths,	  since	  the	  probability	  of	  any	  necessary	  truth	  is	  1.	  But	  what	  is	  the	  relevant	  notion	  of	  necessary	  truth?	  A	  necessary	  truth	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  one	  that	  is	  true	  at	  all	  points	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  This	  informal	  statement	  of	  the	  axioms	  is	  taken	  from	  Christensen	  (2004:	  16).	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probability	  space,	  but	  different	  interpretations	  of	  probability	  space	  yield	  different	  interpretations	  of	  probabilistic	  coherence.2	  On	  a	  logical	  interpretation,	  the	  points	  in	  probability	  space	  are	  logical	  possibilities	  and	  necessary	  truths	  are	  logical	  truths.	  On	  this	  interpretation,	  probabilistic	  coherence	  requires	  that	  one	  is	  logically	  omniscient	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  is	  certain	  of	  all	  logical	  truths,	  one	  is	  equally	  confident	  of	  all	  logically	  equivalent	  propositions,	  and	  one	  has	  at	  least	  as	  much	  confidence	  in	  each	  of	  the	  logical	  consequences	  of	  a	  proposition	  as	  one	  has	  in	  the	  proposition	  itself.3	  Arguably,	  however,	  the	  logical	  interpretation	  is	  too	  narrow,	  since	  the	  boundaries	  of	  logic	  are	  typically	  drawn	  in	  a	  way	  that	  excludes	  apriori	  truths	  of	  arithmetic,	  probability	  theory,	  epistemology,	  and	  so	  on.	  Why	  suppose	  that	  rationality	  requires	  being	  certain	  of	  logical	  truths	  but	  not	  these	  other	  apriori	  truths?	  On	  a	  metaphysical	  interpretation,	  the	  points	  in	  probability	  space	  are	  metaphysical	  possibilities.	  On	  this	  interpretation,	  probabilistic	  coherence	  requires	  that	  one	  is	  certain	  of	  all	  metaphysically	  necessary	  truths.	  But	  while	  the	  logical	  interpretation	  seems	  too	  narrow,	  the	  metaphysical	  interpretation	  seems	  too	  broad.	  It	  is	  implausible	  that	  rationality	  requires	  one	  to	  be	  certain	  of	  Kripkean	  aposteriori	  metaphysical	  necessities:	  that	  Hesperus	  is	  Phosphorus,	  that	  water	  is	  H2O,	  and	  so	  on.	  Moreover,	  for	  any	  metaphysically	  contingent	  aposteriori	  truth	  that	  p,	  there	  is	  a	  metaphysically	  necessary	  aposteriori	  truth	  that	  it	  is	  actually	  the	  case	  that	  p.	  So,	  on	  this	  proposal,	  probabilistic	  coherence	  requires	  omniscience	  about	  the	  actual	  world.	  David	  Chalmers	  (2011)	  proposes	  an	  epistemic	  interpretation	  on	  which	  the	  points	  in	  probability	  space	  are	  epistemic	  possibilities.	  An	  epistemic	  possibility	  is	  construed	  as	  a	  maximally	  specific	  proposition	  about	  the	  actual	  world	  that	  cannot	  be	  ruled	  out	  conclusively	  –	  that	  is,	  infallibly,	  indefeasibly,	  and	  indubitably	  –	  by	  an	  ideal	  process	  of	  apriori	  reasoning.	  On	  this	  interpretation,	  probabilistic	  coherence	  requires	  that	  one	  is	  certain	  of	  any	  truth	  that	  is	  epistemically	  necessary	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See	  Hajek	  (MS)	  for	  discussion	  of	  the	  link	  between	  probability	  and	  modality	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  regularity	  thesis	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  thesis	  that	  if	  pr	  (P)	  =	  1,	  then	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  P.	  3	  The	  requirement	  of	  logical	  omniscience	  is	  also	  a	  consequence	  of	  deductive	  theories	  of	  rationality	  that	  require	  logical	  consistency	  and	  closure.	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be	  justified	  conclusively	  by	  ideal	  apriori	  reasoning.	  In	  a	  slogan,	  probabilistic	  coherence	  requires	  not	  just	  logical	  omniscience,	  but	  apriori	  omniscience.4	  Apriori	  omniscience	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  generalization	  of	  logical	  omniscience.	  My	  own	  view	  is	  that	  the	  motivations	  for	  logical	  omniscience	  in	  section	  2	  extend	  to	  other	  apriori	  domains.	  However,	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  extension	  in	  any	  detail.	  So,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  restrict	  my	  focus	  to	  logical	  omniscience	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  extending	  the	  proposal	  in	  future	  work.5	  Logical	  omniscience	  requirements	  are	  often	  regarded	  as	  the	  result	  of	  an	  
idealization	  that	  is	  inherent	  in	  probabilistic	  theories	  of	  rationality.	  But	  what	  is	  the	  relevant	  kind	  of	  idealization?	  We	  can	  distinguish	  genuinely	  normative	  idealization	  from	  the	  non-­‐normative	  idealization	  that	  is	  familiar	  in	  science.	  It	  can	  be	  convenient	  to	  ignore	  false	  predictions	  of	  a	  scientific	  theory	  when	  it	  sufficiently	  approximates	  towards	  the	  truth,	  especially	  when	  these	  are	  mere	  side	  effects	  of	  mathematical	  machinery	  that	  is	  otherwise	  useful	  or	  indispensable.	  To	  take	  just	  one	  well-­‐known	  example,	  the	  Lotka-­‐Volterra	  model	  in	  population	  ecology	  treats	  population	  abundance	  as	  continuous	  when	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  discrete.	  Probabilistic	  theories	  of	  rationality	  are	  not	  scientific	  theories	  of	  human	  reasoning,	  but	  normative	  theories:	  they	  don’t	  tell	  us	  how	  we	  do	  reason,	  but	  how	  we	  
ought	  to	  reason.6	  Nevertheless,	  they	  are	  often	  thought	  to	  involve	  non-­‐normative	  idealizations	  in	  much	  the	  way	  as	  scientific	  theories.	  On	  this	  view,	  logical	  omniscience	  requirements	  are	  idealizations	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  make	  false	  claims	  about	  rationality	  that	  we	  can	  safely	  ignore	  because	  they	  are	  mere	  side	  effects	  of	  the	  mathematics	  of	  the	  probability	  calculus.	  The	  rival	  view	  defended	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  that	  logical	  omniscience	  requirements	  are	  idealizations	  in	  the	  normative	  sense	  that	  they	  make	  true	  claims	  about	  what	  ideal	  rationality	  consists	  in	  –	  that	  is,	  about	  how	  we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Not	  all	  apriori	  truths	  are	  epistemically	  necessary	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  conclusively	  justified,	  including	  Hawthorne’s	  (2002)	  examples	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  “deeply	  contingent	  apriori	  knowledge”.	  5	  I	  am	  particularly	  interested	  in	  the	  extension	  to	  apriori	  epistemic	  principles.	  See	  Titelbaum	  (forthcoming)	  for	  relevant	  discussion.	  6	  See	  Kahneman,	  Slovic	  and	  Tversky	  (1982)	  for	  scientific	  evidence	  that	  we	  routinely	  violate	  probabilistic	  coherence.	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ought	  to	  reason.	  I	  provide	  some	  initial	  motivation	  for	  this	  view	  in	  the	  next	  section	  before	  explaining	  and	  defending	  it	  further	  in	  later	  sections	  of	  the	  paper.	  
	  
2. The	  Asymmetry	  Thesis	  Rationality	  does	  not	  require	  omniscience	  across	  the	  board.	  The	  whole	  point	  of	  rational	  evaluation	  is	  to	  determine	  how	  well	  agents	  respond	  to	  the	  limited	  evidence	  in	  their	  possession.	  Rational	  agents	  respond	  appropriately	  to	  their	  evidence	  even	  when	  it	  is	  limited	  in	  ways	  that	  result	  in	  ignorance	  and	  error	  about	  the	  facts.	  Given	  that	  rationality	  does	  not	  require	  omniscience	  across	  the	  board,	  those	  who	  endorse	  logical	  omniscience	  are	  committed	  to	  an	  asymmetry	  thesis:	  	  
The	  Asymmetry	  Thesis:	  rationality	  requires	  omniscience	  and	  infallibility	  in	  logical	  domains	  but	  not	  empirical	  domains.	  	  But	  what	  could	  motivate	  this	  asymmetry	  between	  logical	  and	  empirical	  domains?	  One	  prominent	  objection	  to	  probabilistic	  theories	  of	  rationality	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  principled	  motivation	  for	  the	  asymmetry	  thesis.	  Richard	  Foley	  gives	  a	  particularly	  clear	  statement	  of	  this	  objection:	  	   If	  a	  logically	  omniscience	  perspective…is	  an	  ideal	  perspective,	  one	  to	  which	  we	  aspire	  and	  one	  that	  we	  can	  do	  a	  better	  or	  worse	  job	  of	  approximating,	  so	  too	  is	  an	  empirically	  omniscient	  perspective.	  If	  this	  were	  a	  reason	  to	  regard	  all	  departures	  from	  logical	  omniscience	  as	  departures	  from	  ideal	  rationality,	  it	  would	  be	  an	  equally	  good	  reason	  to	  regard	  all	  departures	  from	  empirical	  omniscience	  as	  departures	  from	  ideal	  rationality.	  But	  of	  course	  no	  one	  wants	  to	  assert	  this.	  (Foley	  1993:	  161)	  	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  address	  Foley’s	  objection	  by	  providing	  some	  intuitive	  and	  theoretical	  motivation	  for	  the	  asymmetry	  thesis.	  The	  objection	  assumes	  that	  we	  should	  give	  a	  unified	  epistemology	  for	  logical	  and	  empirical	  domains.	  In	  fact,	  however,	  I	  want	  to	  argue	  that	  theoretical	  unification	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is	  not	  a	  virtue	  in	  this	  instance,	  but	  a	  procrustean	  bed.	  There	  are	  structural	  differences	  between	  the	  epistemology	  of	  logical	  and	  empirical	  domains	  that	  are	  distorted	  by	  a	  unified	  theory.	  I	  begin	  with	  an	  intuitive	  contrast.	  It	  is	  a	  familiar	  idea	  that	  a	  Cartesian	  demon	  could	  violate	  the	  connection	  between	  what	  seems	  true	  and	  what	  is	  true	  and	  thereby	  induce	  massive	  ignorance	  and	  error	  in	  the	  empirical	  domain	  without	  thereby	  impugning	  our	  rationality.	  But	  we	  cannot	  easily	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  in	  the	  logical	  domain.	  A	  Cartesian	  demon	  who	  induces	  massive	  ignorance	  and	  error	  by	  violating	  the	  connection	  between	  what	  is	  true	  and	  what	  seems	  true	  in	  the	  logical	  domain	  does	  not	  thereby	  leave	  our	  rationality	  intact.7	  To	  begin	  with	  the	  case	  of	  error,	  consider	  the	  demon’s	  victim	  who	  believes	  that	  contradictions	  are	  true,	  that	  affirming	  the	  consequent	  is	  valid,	  that	  conjunctions	  are	  false	  when	  their	  conjuncts	  are	  true,	  and	  so	  on.	  Moreover,	  she	  believes	  these	  things	  just	  because	  they	  seem	  true.	  Assuming	  symmetry	  between	  logical	  and	  empirical	  domains,	  we	  should	  say	  that	  these	  beliefs	  are	  fully	  rational	  and	  yet	  mistaken.	  But	  that	  just	  seems	  wrong.	  Intuitively,	  the	  demon	  has	  not	  deceived	  the	  subject	  in	  a	  way	  that	  leaves	  her	  rationality	  intact.	  Rather,	  by	  making	  these	  absurdities	  seem	  true,	  the	  demon	  has	  compromised	  her	  rationality.	  Rationality	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  too	  much	  logical	  error.	  Similar	  considerations	  apply	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ignorance.	  Consider	  the	  demon’s	  victim	  who	  is	  agnostic	  about	  whether	  contradictions	  are	  false,	  whether	  affirming	  the	  consequent	  is	  invalid,	  whether	  conjunctions	  are	  true	  when	  their	  conjuncts	  are	  true,	  and	  so	  on.	  She	  does	  not	  believe	  these	  things,	  even	  when	  she	  considers	  them,	  because	  they	  do	  not	  seem	  true.	  Once	  again,	  it	  just	  seems	  wrong	  to	  say	  that	  her	  logical	  ignorance	  leaves	  her	  rationality	  intact	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  sensory	  blindness	  might	  result	  in	  empirical	  ignorance	  about	  the	  environment	  without	  thereby	  compromising	  rationality.	  Rationality	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  too	  much	  logical	  ignorance.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  I	  am	  indebted	  here	  to	  discussion	  with	  Roger	  White.	  See	  also	  Jarvis	  and	  Ichikawa	  (2013:	  Ch.	  12-­‐13)	  for	  related	  discussion	  in	  the	  context	  of	  their	  critique	  of	  what	  they	  call	  ‘experiential	  rationalism’.	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So	  there	  is	  an	  asymmetry	  between	  logical	  and	  empirical	  domains.	  In	  the	  logical	  domain,	  but	  not	  the	  empirical	  domain,	  a	  Cartesian	  demon	  could	  induce	  massive	  ignorance	  and	  error	  by	  violating	  the	  connection	  between	  what	  seems	  true	  and	  what	  is	  true	  without	  thereby	  compromising	  one’s	  rationality.	  Even	  so,	  the	  asymmetry	  thesis	  might	  seem	  like	  overkill	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  committed	  to	  the	  thesis	  that	  rationality	  requires	  logical	  omniscience.	  After	  all,	  we	  don’t	  always	  regard	  violations	  of	  logical	  omniscience	  as	  irrational.	  In	  section	  5,	  I’ll	  respond	  to	  this	  objection	  by	  drawing	  a	  distinction	  between	  ordinary	  standards	  of	  rationality	  that	  take	  into	  account	  our	  human	  limitations	  and	  ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality	  that	  abstract	  away	  from	  them.	  Logical	  omniscience	  is	  required	  by	  the	  very	  demanding	  standards	  of	  ideal	  rationality,	  but	  not	  the	  more	  relaxed	  standards	  of	  ordinary	  rationality.	  Ordinary	  standards	  of	  rationality	  are	  consistent	  with	  some	  degree	  of	  logical	  ignorance	  and	  error	  even	  if	  there	  are	  limits	  on	  how	  far	  it	  can	  extend.	  But	  logical	  ignorance	  and	  error	  always	  constitutes	  some	  departure	  from	  ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality.	  The	  intuitive	  motivation	  for	  the	  asymmetry	  thesis	  is	  not	  irresistible.	  One	  might	  follow	  Huemer	  (2001)	  in	  maintaining	  that	  the	  victim	  of	  deception	  can	  be	  fully	  rational	  and	  yet	  massively	  mistaken	  about	  logic.	  Or	  one	  might	  follow	  Williamson	  (2007)	  in	  denying	  that	  the	  victim	  of	  deception	  can	  be	  fully	  rational	  while	  massively	  mistaken	  about	  the	  empirical	  domain.	  But	  these	  responses	  threaten	  to	  obscure	  the	  intuitive	  differences	  between	  logical	  and	  empirical	  domains.	  Even	  so,	  one	  might	  reasonably	  doubt	  how	  much	  weight	  these	  intuitive	  considerations	  can	  bear.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  more	  principled	  theoretical	  motivation	  for	  the	  asymmetry	  thesis,	  the	  relevant	  intuitions	  might	  be	  outweighed	  by	  the	  theoretical	  advantages	  of	  unifying	  the	  epistemology	  of	  logical	  and	  empirical	  domains.	  Arguably,	  however,	  these	  intuitive	  considerations	  do	  point	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  more	  principled	  theoretical	  motivation	  for	  the	  asymmetry	  thesis.	  Christensen	  (2004)	  proposes	  an	  argument	  for	  a	  version	  of	  the	  asymmetry	  thesis	  in	  the	  following	  passage:	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Logical	  omniscience	  emerges	  naturally	  as	  the	  limiting	  case	  of	  one	  of	  the	  basic	  ingredients	  of	  good	  thinking,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  empirical	  omniscience	  does	  not.	  We	  know	  that	  certain	  structural	  aspects	  of	  the	  claims	  we	  believe	  have	  a	  bearing	  on	  their	  possible	  truths	  (e.g.	  a	  conjunction	  is	  true	  only	  if	  each	  of	  its	  conjuncts	  is	  true).	  Formal	  logic	  studies	  these	  relationships.	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  many	  instances	  of	  bad	  thinking	  involve	  failing	  to	  respect	  these	  relationships	  (we	  should	  not	  believe	  a	  conjunction	  more	  strongly	  than	  its	  conjuncts).	  Eliminating	  this	  sort	  of	  mistake	  yields,	  in	  the	  limit,	  logical	  omniscience.	  Given	  that	  no	  such	  result	  holds	  for	  empirical	  omniscience,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  we	  have	  a	  clear	  motivation	  for	  treating	  the	  two	  differently	  when	  theorizing	  about	  rationality.	  (2004:	  156-­‐7)	  	  Christensen	  illustrates	  the	  point	  with	  the	  following	  example.	  Kelly	  knows	  that	  she	  is	  near	  a	  grizzly	  bear	  cub	  and	  that	  anyone	  near	  a	  grizzly	  bear	  cub	  is	  in	  danger.	  But	  she	  doesn’t	  “put	  two	  and	  two	  together”	  and	  so	  she	  fails	  to	  conclude	  that	  she	  is	  in	  danger.	  Meanwhile,	  Cherry	  also	  knows	  that	  anyone	  near	  a	  grizzly	  bear	  cub	  is	  in	  danger,	  but	  she	  doesn’t	  know	  that	  Kelly	  is	  near	  a	  grizzly	  bear	  cub,	  and	  so	  she	  doesn’t	  infer	  that	  Kelly	  is	  in	  danger.	  Intuitively,	  Kelly	  is	  rationally	  defective	  because	  she	  fails	  to	  respect	  logical	  relationships,	  but	  Cherry	  is	  not	  since	  she	  is	  merely	  ignorant	  of	  an	  empirical	  fact.	  Christensen	  concludes,	  “There	  is	  a	  clear	  intuitive	  basis	  in	  our	  ordinary	  conception	  of	  rationality	  for	  distinguishing	  logical	  lapses	  from	  ordinary	  cases	  of	  factual	  ignorance”	  (2004:	  155).	  Christensen’s	  argument	  for	  the	  asymmetry	  thesis	  can	  be	  reconstructed	  as	  follows.	  The	  first	  step	  is	  that	  rationality	  is	  an	  ideal	  of	  good	  reasoning:	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  being	  ideally	  rational	  requires	  reasoning	  well.	  The	  second	  step	  is	  that	  reasoning	  well	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense	  does	  not	  require	  empirical	  omniscience	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  is	  certain	  of	  all	  empirical	  truths.	  Good	  reasoning	  is	  perfectly	  consistent	  with	  empirical	  ignorance	  and	  error.	  The	  third	  step	  is	  that	  reasoning	  well	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense	  requires	  logical	  omniscience	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  is	  certain	  of	  all	  logical	  truths.	  Good	  reasoning	  is	  not	  consistent	  in	  the	  same	  way	  with	  logical	  ignorance	  and	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error.	  Hence,	  the	  conclusion	  follows	  that	  rationality	  requires	  logical	  but	  not	  empirical	  omniscience.	  So	  the	  asymmetry	  thesis	  is	  crucial	  for	  preserving	  a	  rational	  ideal	  of	  good	  reasoning.	  Uncertainty	  and	  error	  about	  logic	  has	  negative	  ramifications	  for	  the	  quality	  of	  one’s	  reasoning.	  For	  instance,	  if	  I	  doubt	  that	  modus	  ponens	  is	  valid,	  I	  might	  be	  very	  confident	  that	  I’m	  near	  a	  bear	  cub,	  while	  being	  much	  less	  confident	  that	  I’m	  in	  danger,	  despite	  being	  certain	  that	  if	  I’m	  near	  a	  bear	  cub,	  then	  I’m	  in	  danger.	  Similarly,	  if	  I’m	  confident	  that	  affirming	  the	  consequent	  is	  valid,	  then	  I	  might	  be	  very	  confident	  that	  I’m	  near	  a	  bear	  cub	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  my	  confidence	  that	  I’m	  in	  danger	  together	  with	  my	  certainty	  that	  if	  I’m	  near	  a	  bear	  cub,	  then	  I’m	  in	  danger.	  The	  general	  point	  is	  that	  good	  reasoning	  is	  contaminated	  by	  uncertainty	  and	  error	  about	  logic.	  Since	  rationality	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  reasoning	  well,	  it	  follows	  that	  ideal	  rationality	  requires	  omniscience	  and	  infallibility	  about	  logic.	  A	  correlative	  point	  is	  that	  good	  reasoning	  leads	  rationally	  to	  true	  and	  certain	  beliefs	  about	  logic.	  For	  example,	  the	  validity	  of	  modus	  ponens	  can	  be	  ascertained	  by	  reasoning	  in	  accordance	  with	  modus	  ponens	  and	  the	  invalidity	  of	  affirming	  the	  consequent	  can	  be	  ascertained	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way.8	  One	  might	  object	  that	  we	  need	  to	  distinguish	  more	  sharply	  between	  logical	  reasoning	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  beliefs	  about	  logic	  on	  the	  other.	  For	  instance,	  we	  can	  imagine	  someone	  who	  reasons	  well	  without	  forming	  beliefs	  about	  logic	  at	  all.	  Alternatively,	  we	  can	  imagine	  someone	  who	  reasons	  well	  despite	  having	  false	  beliefs	  about	  logic	  because	  their	  reasoning	  does	  not	  take	  those	  beliefs	  into	  account.	  Arguably,	  however,	  reasoning	  well	  by	  ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality	  involves	  reasoning	  one’s	  way	  towards	  beliefs	  about	  logic	  and	  then	  integrating	  one’s	  logical	  reasoning	  with	  one’s	  beliefs	  about	  logic.	  I	  conclude	  that	  the	  asymmetry	  thesis	  is	  initially	  well	  motivated	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  intuitive	  and	  theoretical	  considerations.	  Still,	  the	  asymmetry	  thesis	  stands	  in	  need	  of	  further	  explanation.	  This	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  section	  3.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  See	  Boghossian	  (2000)	  in	  defense	  of	  rule-­‐circular	  justification	  for	  logical	  beliefs.	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3. Explaining	  the	  Asymmetry	  Thesis	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  section	  is	  to	  propose	  an	  account	  of	  apriori	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  about	  logic	  that	  is	  designed	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  asymmetry	  thesis	  is	  true.	  What	  explains	  why	  rationality	  requires	  omniscience	  and	  infallibility	  in	  logical	  domains	  but	  not	  empirical	  domains?	  My	  working	  assumption	  is	  that	  facts	  about	  rationality	  are	  explained	  by	  facts	  about	  reasons	  or	  justification.	  More	  specifically,	  I	  assume	  that	  rationality	  requires	  one	  to	  believe	  a	  proposition	  just	  when	  and	  because	  one	  has	  sufficient	  reason	  or	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  proposition.	  And	  one	  complies	  with	  the	  requirement	  just	  when	  and	  because	  one	  believes	  the	  proposition	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sufficient	  reasons	  or	  justification.	  If	  rationality	  requires	  one	  to	  be	  certain	  of	  all	  logical	  truths,	  then	  it	  follows	  that	  one	  has	  sufficient	  reason	  or	  justification	  to	  do	  so.	  But	  then	  what	  could	  be	  the	  source	  of	  this	  justification?	  The	  explanation	  that	  I	  propose	  appeals	  to	  an	  asymmetry	  in	  the	  sources	  of	  reasons	  or	  justification	  in	  logical	  and	  empirical	  domains.	  Aposteriori	  justification	  for	  empirical	  beliefs	  has	  its	  source	  in	  experience,	  whereas	  apriori	  justification	  for	  logical	  beliefs	  has	  its	  source	  in	  the	  logical	  facts	  themselves.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  logical	  domain	  has	  a	  fact-­‐based	  epistemology,	  whereas	  the	  empirical	  domain	  has	  an	  experience-­‐based	  epistemology.	  The	  asymmetry	  thesis	  therefore	  has	  important	  consequences	  for	  the	  role	  of	  experience	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  logic.	  Apriori	  justification	  is	  traditionally	  defined	  as	  justification	  that	  does	  not	  have	  its	  source	  in	  experience.9	  But	  the	  term	  ‘experience’	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  broad	  sense	  or	  a	  narrow	  sense.	  The	  narrow	  sense	  of	  the	  term	  refers	  only	  to	  perceptual	  experience	  in	  the	  various	  sensory	  modalities.	  But	  some	  philosophers	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  cognitive	  experience	  associated	  with	  understanding,	  reasoning,	  and	  intuition	  that	  is	  sui	  generis	  and	  irreducible	  to	  perceptual	  experience.	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘experience’	  in	  a	  broad	  sense	  that	  includes	  any	  mental	  state	  or	  episode	  that	  is	  conscious	  in	  the	  phenomenal	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  “something	  it	  is	  like”	  for	  the	  subject	  to	  undergo	  that	  mental	  state	  or	  episode.	  Experience	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  a	  genus	  whose	  species	  include	  both	  perceptual	  experience	  and	  cognitive	  experience.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  See	  Casullo	  (2003:	  Ch.	  2)	  for	  the	  traditional	  definition	  and	  discussion	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  broad	  and	  narrow	  conceptions	  of	  experience.	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What	  is	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  experience	  so	  construed?	  More	  specifically,	  does	  experience	  play	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  role	  in	  apriori	  and	  aposteriori	  domains?	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  compare	  and	  contrast	  two	  opposing	  answers	  to	  this	  question.	  Experientialism	  is	  the	  view	  that	  all	  justification	  has	  its	  source	  in	  experience	  and	  hence	  the	  distinction	  between	  apriori	  and	  aposteriori	  justification	  is	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  distinction	  between	  experiential	  sources:	  	  aposteriori	  justification	  has	  its	  source	  in	  perceptual	  experience,	  whereas	  apriori	  justification	  has	  its	  source	  in	  cognitive	  experience.	  Non-­‐experientialism	  is	  the	  view	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  apriori	  and	  aposteriori	  justification	  is	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  distinction	  between	  experiential	  and	  non-­‐experiential	  sources:	  aposteriori	  justification	  has	  its	  source	  in	  experience,	  whereas	  apriori	  justification	  does	  not.	  On	  this	  view,	  not	  all	  justification	  has	  its	  source	  in	  experience.	  Experientialism	  can	  be	  illustrated	  with	  reference	  to	  Huemer’s	  (2001:	  99)	  principle	  of	  phenomenal	  conservatism:	  	  
Phenomenal	  Conservatism:	  if	  one	  has	  an	  experience	  in	  which	  it	  seems	  to	  one	  that	  p,	  then	  one	  thereby	  has	  defeasible	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  p.	  	  One	  of	  the	  attractions	  of	  phenomenal	  conservatism	  is	  that	  it	  promises	  to	  unify	  the	  epistemic	  roles	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  and	  cognitive	  experience	  by	  subsuming	  them	  under	  a	  single	  epistemic	  principle.	  As	  stated,	  phenomenal	  conservatism	  states	  only	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  for	  defeasible	  justification,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  strengthened	  to	  yield	  conditions	  that	  are	  both	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  defeasible	  justification:	  	  
Strengthened	   Phenomenal	   Conservatism:	   one	   has	   defeasible	   justification	   to	  believe	  that	  p	  iff	  one	  has	  an	  experience	  in	  which	  it	  seems	  to	  one	  that	  p.	  
	  The	  result	  is	  a	  version	  of	  experientialism	  on	  which	  all	  justification	  has	  its	  source	  in	  experiential	  seemings.	  According	  to	  Huemer,	  the	  category	  of	  experiential	  seemings	  includes	  not	  only	  sensory	  or	  perceptual	  seemings,	  but	  also	  cognitive	  or	  intellectual	  seemings.	  So	  the	  distinction	  between	  apriori	  and	  aposteriori	  justification	  can	  be	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defined	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  distinction	  among	  experiential	  seemings:	  aposteriori	  justification	  is	  aposteriori	  has	  its	  source	  in	  perceptual	  experience,	  while	  apriori	  justification	  has	  its	  source	  in	  cognitive	  experience.10	  Experientialism	  is	  very	  much	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  asymmetry	  thesis.	  According	  to	  experientialism,	  all	  justification	  has	  its	  source	  in	  experience.	  However,	  experience	  is	  not	  perfectly	  calibrated	  with	  the	  facts.	  There	  is	  no	  guarantee	  either	  in	  the	  case	  of	  perception	  or	  cognition	  that	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  true	  is	  in	  fact	  true	  or	  vice	  versa.	  Experientialism	  is	  therefore	  consistent	  with	  the	  rationality	  of	  widespread	  ignorance	  and	  error	  in	  apriori	  and	  aposteriori	  domains	  alike.	  One	  might	  supplement	  experientialism	  with	  the	  further	  condition	  that	  an	  experiential	  seeming	  provides	  justification	  to	  believe	  a	  proposition	  only	  if	  it	  is	  true.	  Moreover,	  one	  might	  stipulate	  that	  the	  justification	  provided	  by	  these	  experiential	  seemings	  is	  infallible,	  indefeasible,	  and	  indubitable.	  But	  this	  sacrifices	  the	  unity	  between	  apriori	  and	  aposteriori	  domains	  and	  thereby	  undercuts	  much	  of	  the	  motivation	  for	  experientialism.	  Moreover,	  it	  fails	  to	  explain	  the	  asymmetry	  thesis,	  since	  logical	  truths	  need	  not	  seem	  true,	  so	  it	  preserves	  logical	  infallibility	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  abandoning	  logical	  omniscience.	  To	  explain	  the	  asymmetry	  thesis,	  I	  propose	  a	  version	  of	  non-­‐experientialism	  on	  which	  apriori	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  about	  logic	  has	  its	  source	  not	  in	  facts	  about	  experience,	  but	  rather	  in	  the	  logical	  facts	  that	  one	  has	  apriori	  justification	  to	  believe.	  On	  this	  view,	  logical	  truths	  themselves	  provide	  apriori	  justification	  that	  is	  infallible,	  indefeasible,	  and	  indubitable.	  Following	  Alston	  (1971),	  I	  call	  this	  a	  truth-­‐sufficiency	  account	  of	  a	  priori	  logical	  justification.11	  There	  is	  a	  foundationalist	  version	  of	  this	  proposal	  that	  draws	  a	  distinction	  between	  basic	  and	  non-­‐basic	  logical	  truths,	  or	  axioms	  and	  theorems.	  On	  this	  version,	  a	  priori	  justification	  to	  believe	  the	  theorems	  has	  its	  source	  in	  a	  priori	  justification	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  See	  BonJour	  (1998),	  Huemer	  (2001),	  Chudnoff	  (2013),	  and	  Bengson	  (forthcoming)	  for	  versions	  of	  experientialism.	  11	  Alston	  considers	  truth-­‐sufficiency	  as	  an	  account	  of	  privileged	  introspective	  access	  to	  one’s	  mental	  states.	  See	  Smithies	  (2012a)	  for	  a	  truth-­‐sufficiency	  account	  of	  introspective	  justification	  that	  provides	  a	  model	  for	  the	  truth-­‐sufficiency	  account	  of	  apriori	  logical	  justification	  proposed	  here.	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believe	  the	  axioms,	  but	  one’s	  a	  priori	  justification	  to	  believe	  the	  axioms	  has	  its	  source	  in	  the	  truth	  of	  those	  axioms.	  For	  current	  purposes,	  I’ll	  remain	  neutral	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  this	  foundationalist	  version	  is	  correct.12	  The	  asymmetry	  thesis	  is	  explained	  by	  an	  asymmetry	  in	  the	  sources	  of	  justification	  in	  logical	  and	  empirical	  domains.	  Aposteriori	  justification	  for	  empirical	  beliefs	  has	  its	  source	  in	  the	  way	  things	  seem,	  whereas	  apriori	  justification	  for	  logical	  beliefs	  has	  its	  source	  in	  the	  way	  things	  are.	  This	  explains	  why	  mismatches	  between	  what	  seems	  true	  and	  what	  is	  true	  constitute	  rational	  failings	  in	  the	  logical	  domain	  but	  not	  the	  empirical	  domain.	  In	  the	  empirical	  domain,	  ideal	  rationality	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  calibrating	  one’s	  beliefs	  with	  the	  experiences	  that	  are	  the	  sources	  of	  one’s	  aposteriori	  justification	  for	  empirical	  beliefs.	  Since	  these	  experiences	  are	  not	  perfectly	  calibrated	  with	  the	  facts,	  ideal	  rationality	  is	  compatible	  with	  ignorance	  and	  error	  in	  the	  empirical	  domain.	  In	  the	  logical	  domain,	  by	  contrast,	  ideal	  rationality	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  calibrating	  one’s	  beliefs	  with	  the	  logical	  facts	  that	  are	  the	  sources	  of	  apriori	  justification	  for	  logical	  beliefs.	  Since	  this	  apriori	  justification	  is	  infallible,	  indefeasible	  and	  indubitable,	  ideal	  rationality	  is	  therefore	  incompatible	  with	  ignorance	  and	  error	  in	  the	  logical	  domain.	  In	  the	  remaining	  sections	  of	  this	  paper,	  I’ll	  develop	  this	  proposal	  in	  response	  to	  a	  series	  of	  objections.	  	  
4. Rationality	  and	  Human	  Limitations	  The	  first	  objection	  I	  want	  to	  consider	  begins	  from	  the	  observation	  that	  complying	  with	  the	  requirement	  of	  logical	  omniscience	  is	  beyond	  our	  limited	  human	  capacities.	  And	  yet,	  the	  objection	  continues,	  we	  cannot	  be	  bound	  by	  a	  requirement	  of	  rationality	  unless	  we	  are	  capable	  of	  complying	  with	  it.	  Therefore,	  it	  follows	  that	  logical	  omniscience	  is	  not	  a	  requirement	  of	  rationality	  after	  all.	  Here	  is	  a	  more	  detailed	  formulation	  of	  the	  objection	  that	  combines	  a	  deontological	  conception	  of	  rationality	  with	  a	  rational	  ‘ought’	  implies	  ‘can’	  principle:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  This	  may	  have	  been	  Frege’s	  view.	  See	  Burge	  (1998)	  for	  discussion.	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(1) If	  rationality	  requires	  logical	  omniscience,	  then	  I	  ought	  to	  comply	  with	  this	  requirement.	  (The	  deontological	  conception	  of	  rationality.)	  (2) If	  I	  ought	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  requirement	  of	  logical	  omniscience,	  then	  I	  am	  capable	  of	  complying	  with	  it.	  (The	  rational	  ‘ought’	  implies	  ‘can’	  principle.)	  (3) Therefore,	  if	  rationality	  requires	  logical	  omniscience,	  then	  I	  am	  capable	  of	  complying	  with	  this	  requirement.	  (4) I	  am	  not	  able	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  requirement	  of	  logical	  omniscience.	  (5) Therefore,	  rationality	  does	  not	  require	  logical	  omniscience.	  	  Premise	  (4)	  is	  hard	  to	  dispute.	  There	  are	  infinitely	  many	  logical	  truths	  and,	  since	  we	  are	  finite	  creatures,	  we	  cannot	  grasp	  all	  of	  them.	  One	  might	  respond	  that	  there	  are	  infinitely	  many	  truths	  such	  that	  a	  finite	  creature	  can	  grasp	  each	  of	  them	  individually	  even	  if	  they	  cannot	  grasp	  all	  of	  them	  collectively.	  But	  there	  are	  no	  finite	  limits	  on	  the	  complexity	  of	  logical	  truths	  and	  so	  there	  will	  be	  always	  be	  some	  that	  are	  beyond	  the	  grasp	  of	  any	  finite	  creature.	  One	  might	  restrict	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  logical	  omniscience	  requirement	  to	  propositions	  that	  the	  thinker	  can	  grasp.13	  But	  the	  problem	  remains	  because	  grasping	  a	  proposition	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  ascertaining	  whether	  it	  is	  true.	  It	  is	  not	  within	  normal	  human	  capacity	  to	  infallibly	  determine	  the	  logical	  truths.	  Moreover,	  the	  logical	  truths	  are	  not	  decidable,	  so	  there	  is	  in	  principle	  no	  algorithm	  that	  could	  generate	  all	  of	  them.	  The	  interim	  conclusion	  (3)	  is	  much	  less	  plausible.	  It	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  objection	  that	  avoiding	  epistemic	  irrationality	  is	  sometimes	  beyond	  the	  capacity	  of	  individual	  human	  subjects.	  Consider	  patients	  with	  Capgras	  delusion	  who	  believes	  their	  spouse	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  an	  imposter	  or	  patients	  with	  Cotard	  delusion	  who	  believes	  they	  are	  dead.	  These	  delusional	  patients	  are	  incapable	  of	  complying	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  irrationality.14	  One	  might	  reply	  that	  this	  is	  within	  normal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  We	  need	  some	  restriction	  because	  every	  concept	  can	  figure	  in	  some	  logical	  truth,	  but	  rationality	  does	  not	  require	  grasping	  every	  concept.	  So	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  logical	  omniscience	  requirement	  should	  be	  restricted	  to	  propositions	  composed	  from	  concepts	  that	  the	  subject	  actually	  grasps	  or	  would	  if	  she	  were	  ideally	  rational.	  14	  See	  Feldman	  and	  Conee	  (1985:	  17),	  Alston	  (1988:	  286-­‐8),	  Pryor	  (2001:	  114-­‐5),	  and	  Christensen	  (2004:	  161-­‐2)	  for	  additional	  examples	  of	  this	  kind.	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human	  capacity	  even	  if	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  capacity	  of	  delusional	  patients.	  But	  if	  there	  are	  requirements	  of	  rationality	  that	  apply	  to	  individual	  human	  beings	  who	  are	  incapable	  of	  meeting	  them,	  then	  why	  can't	  there	  be	  requirements	  of	  rationality	  that	  are	  beyond	  human	  capacities	  in	  general?	  In	  general,	  there	  is	  no	  good	  reason	  to	  suppose	  that	  all	  evaluative	  ideals	  worth	  caring	  about	  must	  be	  humanly	  attainable.	  We	  can	  and	  do	  evaluate	  the	  performance	  of	  human	  beings	  along	  dimensions	  whose	  extremes	  lie	  beyond	  human	  reach.	  Ideals	  of	  rationality	  –	  like	  ideals	  of	  morality,	  scientific	  understanding,	  and	  chess	  –	  may	  lie	  beyond	  our	  limited	  human	  capacities.	  The	  ideals	  themselves	  need	  not	  be	  humanly	  achievable	  so	  long	  as	  we	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  better	  and	  worse	  approximation	  towards	  those	  ideals.	  Christensen	  (2004:	  162)	  puts	  the	  point	  effectively:	  “Not	  all	  evaluation	  need	  be	  circumscribed	  by	  the	  abilities	  of	  the	  evaluated.	  In	  epistemology,	  as	  in	  various	  other	  areas,	  we	  need	  not	  grade	  on	  effort.”	  If	  the	  interim	  conclusion	  (3)	  is	  false,	  then	  so	  is	  premise	  (1)	  or	  premise	  (2).	  But	  which	  of	  these	  premises	  should	  we	  reject?	  Does	  rationality	  impose	  an	  epistemic	  obligation	  upon	  us	  to	  be	  logically	  omniscient	  and,	  if	  so,	  does	  it	  follow	  that	  we	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  discharging	  this	  epistemic	  obligation?	  Following	  Alston	  (1988),	  we	  might	  reject	  premise	  (1)	  by	  abandoning	  the	  deontological	  conception	  of	  rationality	  as	  a	  source	  of	  requirements	  that	  we	  are	  obliged	  to	  comply	  with	  and	  replacing	  it	  with	  an	  evaluative	  conception	  of	  rationality	  as	  a	  source	  of	  evaluative	  ideals.	  On	  this	  view,	  there	  is	  no	  obligation	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  rational	  requirement	  of	  logical	  omniscience,	  but	  there	  is	  nevertheless	  a	  distinctive	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  value	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  compliance.	  An	  alternative	  reaction	  is	  to	  accept	  the	  deontological	  conception	  of	  rationality	  as	  stated	  in	  premise	  (1)	  but	  to	  reject	  the	  ‘ought’	  implies	  ‘can’	  principle	  as	  stated	  in	  premise	  (2).	  Feldman	  (2000)	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  “role-­‐oughts”	  that	  apply	  to	  anyone	  who	  occupies	  a	  certain	  role	  regardless	  of	  how	  well	  they	  are	  able	  to	  play	  that	  role	  –	  for	  instance,	  chefs	  ought	  to	  make	  delicious	  food	  and	  jugglers	  ought	  to	  keep	  their	  balls	  in	  the	  air	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  doing	  so.	  Similarly,	  there	  are	  epistemic	  ‘oughts’	  that	  apply	  to	  us	  in	  virtue	  of	  our	  role	  as	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believers.	  As	  Feldman	  (2000:	  676)	  puts	  the	  point:	  “It	  is	  our	  plight	  to	  be	  believers.	  We	  ought	  to	  do	  it	  right.	  It	  doesn’t	  matter	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  do	  so.”	  Deciding	  between	  these	  options	  depends	  on	  how	  we	  understand	  the	  relationship	  between	  values	  and	  obligations.	  Are	  we	  obliged	  to	  achieve	  evaluative	  ideals	  or	  merely	  to	  approximate	  towards	  them	  as	  closely	  as	  we	  can?	  Perhaps	  we	  can	  recognize	  a	  “thin”	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  are	  obliged	  to	  achieve	  ideals	  regardless	  of	  whether	  we	  are	  capable	  of	  doing	  so.	  According	  to	  Feldman	  and	  Conee,	  for	  example,	  “In	  any	  case	  of	  a	  standard	  for	  conduct…it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  speak	  of	  ‘requirements’	  or	  ‘obligations’	  that	  the	  standard	  imposes”	  (1985:	  19).	  But	  we	  can	  also	  recognize	  a	  “thick”	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  have	  obligations	  that	  we	  can	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  discharging	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  makes	  it	  appropriate	  to	  adopt	  reactive	  attitudes,	  such	  as	  praise	  and	  blame.	  Our	  obligations	  in	  this	  thick	  sense	  depend	  upon	  the	  limitations	  of	  our	  capacities	  –	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  we	  are	  obliged	  only	  to	  approximate	  towards	  ideals	  insofar	  as	  we	  are	  capable	  of	  doing	  so.15	  The	  argument	  equivocates	  between	  thick	  and	  thin	  senses	  of	  ‘ought’.	  In	  the	  thin	  sense,	  premise	  (1)	  is	  true,	  but	  premise	  (2)	  is	  false,	  whereas	  in	  the	  thick	  sense,	  premise	  (1)	  is	  false,	  but	  premise	  (2)	  is	  true.	  But	  there	  is	  no	  reading	  of	  the	  argument	  on	  which	  both	  of	  its	  premises	  are	  true.	  However	  we	  interpret	  the	  argument,	  it	  fails	  to	  establish	  that	  the	  requirements	  of	  rationality	  must	  be	  humanly	  attainable.	  	  
5. Ideal	  Versus	  Non-­‐Ideal	  Rationality	  The	  thesis	  that	  rationality	  requires	  logical	  omniscience	  also	  conflicts	  with	  our	  ordinary	  evaluations	  of	  rationality.	  We	  don’t	  always	  regard	  violations	  of	  logical	  omniscience	  as	  irrational.	  In	  fact,	  we	  often	  regard	  them	  as	  eminently	  reasonable.	  Christensen	  illustrates	  the	  point	  with	  the	  following	  example:	  	   Suppose	   I	   prove	   a	   somewhat	   complex	   theorem	   of	   logic.	   I’ve	   checked	   the	  proof	  several	  times,	  and	  I’m	  extremely	  confident	  about	  it.	  Still,	  it	  might	  seem	  quite	  reasonable	  for	  me	  to	  be	  somewhat	  less	  than	  100%	  confident.	  I	  should	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Compare	  Pryor	  (2001:	  115,	  fn.	  36)	  for	  a	  related	  distinction	  between	  thick	  and	  thin	  senses	  of	  ‘obligation’.	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not,	   for	   example,	   bet	   my	   house	   against	   a	   nickel	   that	   the	   proof	   is	   correct.	  (Christensen	  2007:	  8)	  	  If	  it	  is	  reasonable	  for	  me	  to	  be	  certain	  that	  the	  proof	  is	  correct,	  then	  it	  is	  reasonable	  for	  me	  to	  bet	  my	  house	  against	  a	  nickel	  in	  the	  certainty	  that	  I	  will	  win.	  Intuitively,	  however,	  it	  would	  be	  quite	  unreasonable	  for	  me	  to	  accept	  this	  bet	  because	  it	  is	  much	  too	  risky.	  I	  know	  that	  I’m	  prone	  towards	  mistakes	  and	  hence	  that	  adopting	  a	  policy	  of	  accepting	  such	  risky	  bets	  is	  liable	  in	  the	  long	  run	  to	  leave	  me	  homeless	  with	  nothing	  but	  a	  pocket	  full	  of	  small	  change.	  It	  is	  therefore	  unreasonable	  for	  me	  to	  be	  certain	  that	  the	  proof	  is	  correct.	  My	  response,	  as	  indicated	  in	  section	  2,	  is	  to	  distinguish	  between	  ordinary	  standards	  of	  rationality	  that	  take	  into	  account	  our	  contingent	  human	  limitations	  and	  ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality	  that	  abstract	  away	  from	  them.16	  In	  Christensen’s	  example,	  ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality	  require	  accepting	  the	  bet,	  whereas	  ordinary	  standards	  require	  rejecting	  the	  bet.	  Since	  these	  requirements	  conflict,	  one	  might	  ask	  which	  we	  ought	  to	  follow.	  But	  this	  question	  has	  no	  context-­‐dependent	  answer:	  it	  depends	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  one	  is	  taking	  our	  contingent	  human	  limitations	  into	  account.	  In	  the	  terminology	  of	  section	  4,	  there	  is	  a	  “thin”	  sense	  in	  which	  one	  ought	  to	  comply	  with	  ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality,	  but	  there	  is	  also	  a	  “thick”	  sense	  in	  which	  one	  ought	  to	  comply	  with	  ordinary	  standards.	  Our	  ordinary	  evaluations	  reflect	  standards	  of	  rationality	  that	  we	  can	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  meeting	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  makes	  it	  appropriate	  to	  adopt	  reactive	  attitudes	  such	  as	  praise	  and	  blame.	  One	  might	  be	  suspicious	  that	  this	  distinction	  undermines	  much	  of	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  thesis	  that	  rationality	  requires	  logical	  omniscience.	  If	  our	  ordinary	  evaluations	  of	  rationality	  reflect	  non-­‐ideal	  standards,	  then	  why	  should	  we	  care	  about	  ideal	  standards?	  They	  might	  be	  relevant	  for	  ideal	  agents,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  relevance	  they	  have	  for	  non-­‐ideal	  agents	  like	  us.	  My	  response	  is	  that	  our	  ordinary	  standards	  of	  rationality	  are	  best	  understood	  as	  approximations	  towards	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  See	  Schoenfield	  (2012)	  for	  a	  related	  distinction	  between	  two	  notions	  of	  rationality:	  what	  your	  evidence	  supports	  versus	  what	  you	  ought	  to	  believe	  given	  your	  evidence.	  See	  also	  Schoenfield	  (MS)	  for	  further	  development	  of	  her	  proposal.	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ideal	  standards	  that	  take	  our	  contingent	  human	  limitations	  into	  account.	  But	  it	  is	  a	  further	  question	  how	  this	  approximation	  is	  to	  be	  understood.	  One	  model	  says	  that	  one’s	  credences	  approximate	  more	  closely	  towards	  ideal	  rationality	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  closer	  to	  the	  credences	  that	  ideal	  rationality	  requires.	  But	  this	  model	  is	  clearly	  problematic.	  Suppose	  you	  give	  me	  a	  list	  of	  50	  theorems	  and	  50	  anti-­‐theorems	  that	  are	  so	  complicated	  that	  I’m	  at	  chance	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  picking	  between	  them.	  In	  this	  forced-­‐choice	  scenario,	  it	  is	  not	  reasonable	  by	  ordinary	  standards	  to	  be	  more	  confident	  of	  the	  theorems	  and	  less	  confident	  of	  the	  anti-­‐theorems.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  remain	  have	  a	  credence	  of	  0.5	  in	  each	  one.	  So	  the	  approximation	  has	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  different	  way.	  A	  better	  model	  says	  that	  one’s	  credences	  approximate	  more	  closely	  towards	  ideal	  rationality	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  held	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  better	  reasoning	  –	  that	  is,	  reasoning	  that	  approximates	  more	  closely	  towards	  ideal	  reasoning.17	  In	  the	  forced-­‐choiced	  scenario,	  it	  is	  not	  reasonable	  to	  be	  more	  confident	  of	  the	  theorems	  and	  less	  confident	  of	  the	  anti-­‐theorems	  because	  this	  would	  manifest	  bad	  reasoning.	  Since	  you’re	  at	  chance	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  picking	  between	  them,	  reasoning	  in	  this	  way	  is	  no	  better	  than	  blind	  guesswork.	  Even	  if	  by	  some	  coincidence	  your	  credences	  align	  closely	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  ideal	  rationality,	  they	  are	  not	  close	  to	  ideally	  rational	  because	  of	  the	  bad	  reasoning	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  they	  are	  held.	  If	  options	  are	  ranked	  by	  the	  standards	  of	  ideal	  rationality,	  then	  ideal	  rationality	  requires	  taking	  the	  options	  that	  are	  optimal	  in	  the	  ranking.	  But	  conforming	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  ideal	  rationality	  is	  sometimes	  beyond	  our	  limited	  human	  capacities.	  The	  options	  that	  are	  optimal	  in	  the	  ideal	  ranking	  may	  be	  beyond	  our	  capacities	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  take	  these	  options	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  good	  enough	  reasoning.	  Ordinary	  standards	  of	  rationality	  do	  not	  require	  us	  to	  take	  options	  that	  are	  beyond	  our	  capacities	  in	  this	  sense.	  The	  options	  required	  by	  ordinary	  standards	  of	  rationality	  are	  the	  best	  options	  that	  remain	  in	  the	  ideal	  ranking	  when	  those	  that	  are	  beyond	  our	  capacities	  have	  been	  excluded.18	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  See	  section	  6	  for	  an	  account	  of	  good	  reasoning.	  18	  On	  Kratzer’s	  (1981)	  semantics,	  ‘S	  ought	  to	  do	  A,’	  is	  true	  in	  a	  context	  C	  if	  S	  does	  A	  in	  all	  of	  the	  possible	  worlds	  in	  the	  contextually	  relevant	  modal	  base	  that	  are	  optimal	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To	  illustrate	  the	  point	  with	  an	  example	  from	  the	  practical	  domain,	  consider	  Gary	  Watson’s	  (1975)	  example	  of	  the	  squash	  player	  who	  is	  defeated	  in	  humiliating	  fashion.	  The	  most	  reasonable	  option	  by	  ideal	  standards	  would	  be	  to	  shake	  the	  opponent’s	  hand	  and	  to	  thank	  him	  for	  the	  game.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  an	  available	  option	  for	  the	  squash	  player	  since	  he	  is	  so	  aggravated	  that	  he	  is	  liable	  to	  lash	  out	  with	  his	  racquet	  in	  anger.	  Even	  if	  he	  manages	  to	  shake	  hands	  without	  lashing	  out,	  it	  would	  seem	  unreasonable	  for	  him	  to	  do	  so,	  since	  he	  is	  in	  such	  danger	  of	  losing	  his	  temper.	  Given	  the	  human	  limitations	  that	  are	  salient	  in	  the	  context,	  the	  most	  reasonable	  option	  by	  ordinary	  standards	  is	  to	  leave	  the	  court	  immediately.	  Similarly,	  in	  Christensen’s	  example,	  the	  most	  reasonable	  option	  by	  ideal	  standards	  is	  to	  accept	  the	  bet	  in	  the	  certain	  knowledge	  that	  one	  will	  win	  a	  nickel.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  an	  available	  option	  for	  non-­‐ideal	  agents	  like	  you	  and	  me.	  We	  might	  accept	  the	  bet	  and	  win,	  but	  we	  cannot	  do	  so	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  good	  enough	  reasoning	  to	  make	  this	  anything	  less	  than	  an	  unreasonably	  risky	  gamble.	  Given	  the	  human	  limitations	  that	  are	  salient	  in	  the	  context,	  the	  most	  reasonable	  option	  by	  ordinary	  standards	  is	  to	  reject	  the	  bet.	  	  
6. The	  Enabling	  Role	  of	  Experience	  The	  version	  of	  non-­‐experientialism	  that	  I	  have	  proposed	  faces	  a	  challenge	  to	  explain	  the	  role	  of	  experience	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  logic.	  Intuitively,	  someone	  who	  has	  an	  experience	  of	  proving	  a	  logical	  theorem	  or	  intuiting	  the	  truth	  of	  a	  logical	  axiom	  is	  thereby	  in	  a	  better	  epistemic	  position	  to	  acquire	  justified	  belief	  than	  someone	  who	  merely	  guesses	  that	  it	  is	  true.	  But	  if	  experience	  is	  not	  a	  source	  of	  apriori	  justification,	  then	  what	  explains	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  subject’s	  epistemic	  position?	  To	  illustrate	  the	  point,	  consider	  two	  subjects:	  Good	  and	  Bad.	  Good	  believes	  some	  logical	  theorem	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  experience	  of	  proving	  that	  it	  is	  true,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  according	  to	  the	  contextually	  relevant	  ordering	  source.	  Using	  Kratzer’s	  framework,	  we	  can	  model	  ideal	  and	  non-­‐ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality	  using	  the	  same	  ordering	  source	  but	  a	  different	  modal	  base.	  In	  contexts	  where	  ideal	  standards	  are	  relevant,	  the	  modal	  base	  includes	  worlds	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  takes	  options	  that	  are	  beyond	  her	  actual	  capacities,	  whereas	  these	  worlds	  are	  excluded	  in	  contexts	  were	  ordinary	  standards	  are	  relevant.	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whereas	  Bad	  has	  no	  relevant	  experience	  of	  this	  kind	  and	  believes	  it	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  blind	  guesswork.	  There	  is	  surely	  some	  epistemic	  disparity	  between	  Good	  and	  Bad	  that	  stands	  in	  need	  of	  explanation.	  But	  if	  Good	  and	  Bad	  have	  equal	  justification	  to	  believe	  the	  logical	  theorem,	  then	  how	  can	  we	  explain	  the	  epistemic	  disparity	  between	  them?	  I	  claim	  that	  the	  epistemic	  disparity	  between	  Good	  and	  Bad	  is	  best	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  distinction	  between	  good	  and	  bad	  reasoning.	  But	  the	  point	  can	  be	  made	  more	  precisely	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  propositional	  justification	  and	  
doxastic	  justification.	  Propositional	  justification	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  having	  reasons	  or	  justification	  to	  believe	  a	  proposition,	  whereas	  doxastic	  justification	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  believing	  a	  proposition	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  reasonable,	  rational,	  or	  justified.	  Doxastic	  justification	  entails	  propositional	  justification,	  but	  not	  vice	  versa,	  since	  one	  can	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  a	  proposition	  that	  one	  does	  not	  believe	  at	  all	  or	  that	  one	  does	  not	  believe	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  justified.	  A	  justified	  belief	  is	  one	  that	  is	  held	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  good	  reasoning	  –	  that	  is,	  it	  is	  held	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  doxastic	  dispositions	  that	  are	  sufficiently	  sensitive	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  propositional	  justification.	  Good	  reasoning	  –	  also	  sometimes	  called	  “proper	  basing”	  –	  is	  what	  converts	  propositional	  justification	  into	  doxastic	  justification.19	  It	  is	  not	  controversial	  that	  there	  is	  a	  distinction	  between	  propositional	  and	  doxastic	  justification.	  A	  more	  controversial	  issue	  is	  whether	  there	  are	  doxastic	  constraints	  on	  propositional	  justification.	  Can	  a	  subject	  have	  propositional	  justification	  for	  a	  belief	  without	  having	  the	  capacity	  to	  convert	  it	  into	  doxastic	  justification	  by	  forming	  the	  belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  good	  reasoning?	  I	  agree	  with	  Feldman	  and	  Conee	  on	  this	  point:	  	   Suppose	  that	  there	  were	  occasions	  when	  forming	  the	  attitude	  that	  best	  fits	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  See	  Kvanvig	  and	  Menzel	  (1990)	  for	  the	  proposal	  that	  doxastic	  justification	  is	  propositional	  justification	  plus	  basing.	  Turri	  (2010)	  proposes	  counterexamples,	  but	  as	  far	  as	  I	  can	  see,	  they	  do	  not	  satisfy	  the	  proper	  basing	  condition	  proposed	  here.	  But	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  that	  the	  proper	  basing	  condition	  can	  be	  understood	  independently	  of	  doxastic	  justification	  and	  so	  immunity	  from	  counterexample	  may	  be	  gained	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  reduction.	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person’s	  evidence	  was	  beyond	  normal	  cognitive	  limits.	  This	  would	  still	  be	  the	  attitude	  justified	  by	  the	  person’s	  evidence.	  If	  the	  person	  had	  normal	  abilities,	  then	  he	  would	  be	  in	  the	  unfortunate	  position	  of	  being	  unable	  to	  do	  what	  is	  justified.	  (1985:	  19)	  	  A	  person’s	  evidence	  may	  justify	  believing	  a	  proposition	  although	  he	  is	  unable	  to	  believe	  the	  proposition	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  appropriately	  based	  on	  the	  evidence.	  To	  illustrate	  this	  point,	  consider	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  speckled	  hen.20	  If	  my	  experience	  represents	  that	  the	  hen	  has	  48	  speckles	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  defeaters,	  then	  I	  have	  propositional	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  hen	  has	  48	  speckles.	  Even	  so,	  if	  I	  were	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  hen	  has	  48	  speckles,	  then	  my	  belief	  would	  be	  doxastically	  unjustified.	  This	  is	  because	  my	  belief	  is	  held	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  doxastic	  dispositions	  that	  are	  not	  appropriately	  sensitive	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  propositional	  justification,	  since	  they	  tend	  to	  yield	  beliefs	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  propositional	  justification.	  For	  instance,	  I	  could	  easily	  have	  believed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  same	  doxastic	  dispositions	  that	  the	  hen	  has	  47	  or	  49	  speckles	  when	  my	  experience	  represents	  that	  it	  has	  48	  speckles,	  or	  that	  it	  has	  48	  speckles	  when	  my	  experience	  represents	  that	  it	  has	  47	  or	  49	  speckles.	  Therefore,	  my	  belief	  does	  not	  satisfy	  the	  proper	  basing	  condition	  for	  doxastic	  justification.	  Now	  consider	  a	  case	  in	  which	  I	  believe	  some	  complicated	  logical	  theorem	  T	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sheer	  guesswork.	  If	  T	  is	  true,	  then	  I	  have	  propositional	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  T	  is	  true.	  Nevertheless,	  if	  I	  were	  to	  believe	  T	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  blind	  guesswork,	  then	  my	  belief	  would	  be	  doxastically	  unjustified.	  Once	  again,	  this	  is	  because	  my	  belief	  is	  held	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  doxastic	  dispositions	  that	  are	  not	  appropriately	  sensitive	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  propositional	  justification,	  since	  they	  tend	  to	  yield	  beliefs	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  propositional	  justification.	  For	  instance,	  I	  could	  easily	  have	  believed	  on	  the	  basis	  those	  very	  same	  doxastic	  dispositions	  some	  proposition	  T*	  that	  is	  not	  a	  logical	  truth,	  but	  a	  logical	  falsehood.	  Therefore,	  my	  belief	  does	  not	  satisfy	  the	  proper	  basing	  condition	  for	  doxastic	  justification.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  See	  Sosa	  (2003)	  and	  Smithies	  (2012b)	  for	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  speckled	  hen	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  the	  basing	  relation.	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Compare	  Sosa’s	  (2003)	  proposal	  that	  one	  knows	  that	  p	  only	  if	  one’s	  belief	  is	  
safe	  from	  error	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  could	  not	  easily	  falsely	  believe	  that	  p.	  The	  safety	  condition	  is	  designed	  to	  explain	  why	  a	  belief	  cannot	  be	  knowledge	  if	  it	  just	  happens	  to	  be	  true.	  But	  it	  fails	  to	  explain	  why	  a	  true	  logical	  belief	  falls	  short	  of	  knowledge	  when	  it	  is	  held	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  blind	  guesswork.	  Such	  a	  belief	  is	  safe	  from	  error	  because	  its	  content	  is	  necessarily	  true,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  thereby	  meet	  the	  conditions	  for	  knowledge.	  Sosa’s	  response	  is	  that	  such	  a	  belief	  is	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  doxastic	  dispositions	  that	  tend	  to	  yield	  false	  beliefs	  that	  are	  not	  safe	  from	  error.	  In	  Sosa’s	  terminology,	  the	  belief	  is	  not	  virtuous	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  “one’s	  belief	  derives	  from	  a	  way	  of	  forming	  beliefs	  that	  is	  an	  intellectual	  virtue,	  one	  that	  in	  our	  normal	  situation	  for	  forming	  such	  beliefs	  would	  tend	  strongly	  enough	  to	  give	  us	  beliefs	  that	  are	  safe”	  (2003:	  290).	  What	  is	  needed	  for	  doxastic	  justification	  is	  not	  safety	  from	  error,	  but	  rather	  safety	  from	  the	  absence	  of	  propositional	  justification.	  In	  the	  empirical	  domain,	  my	  beliefs	  can	  be	  doxastically	  justified	  even	  if	  they	  are	  false,	  and	  so	  not	  safe	  from	  error,	  so	  long	  as	  they	  are	  safe	  from	  the	  absence	  of	  propositional	  justification.	  In	  the	  logical	  domain,	  however,	  there	  is	  no	  distinction	  to	  be	  drawn	  between	  safety	  from	  error	  and	  safety	  from	  the	  absence	  of	  propositional	  justification,	  since	  apriori	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  about	  logic	  has	  its	  source	  in	  the	  logical	  facts	  themselves.	  This	  means	  that	  true	  logical	  beliefs	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  blind	  guesswork	  are	  safe	  from	  error,	  and	  safe	  from	  the	  absence	  of	  propositional	  justification,	  since	  their	  contents	  are	  necessarily	  true.	  But	  they	  are	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  doxastic	  dispositions	  that	  also	  tend	  to	  yield	  beliefs	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  propositional	  justification.	  So	  these	  beliefs	  are	  not	  “virtuous”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  Sosa	  defines.	  This	  is	  why	  they	  do	  not	  satisfy	  the	  proper	  basing	  condition	  for	  doxastic	  justification.	  On	  this	  account,	  good	  reasoning	  or	  “proper	  basing”	  in	  the	  logical	  domain	  is	  really	  just	  a	  matter	  of	  reliability:	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  forming	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  doxastic	  dispositions	  that	  are	  sufficiently	  sensitive	  to	  logical	  truth	  and	  safe	  from	  logical	  error.	  So,	  in	  principle,	  a	  reliable	  faculty	  of	  clairvoyance	  can	  yield	  justified	  beliefs	  about	  logic	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  experience	  of	  intuition	  or	  proof.	  In	  practice,	  however,	  human	  reasoning	  about	  logic	  is	  much	  more	  reliable	  when	  it	  is	  based	  on	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such	  experiences.	  So	  experience	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  enabling	  human	  subjects	  to	  engage	  in	  good	  reasoning	  about	  logic.	  	  Now	  we	  can	  explain	  the	  epistemic	  disparity	  between	  Good	  and	  Bad.	  Both	  Good	  and	  Bad	  believe	  the	  theorem,	  but	  only	  Good	  believes	  it	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  good	  enough	  reasoning.	  After	  all,	  Good	  believes	  it	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  experience	  of	  proving	  the	  theorem,	  whereas	  Bad	  believes	  it	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  blind	  guesswork.	  So	  Good’s	  belief	  is	  held	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  doxastic	  dispositions	  that	  are	  more	  reliably	  sensitive	  to	  the	  logical	  facts.	  Note	  that	  sensitivity	  comes	  in	  degrees.	  The	  claim	  is	  not	  that	  Good’s	  experiences	  of	  proof	  or	  intuition	  are	  perfectly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  logical	  facts	  but	  merely	  that	  they	  are	  more	  sensitive	  than	  blind	  guesswork	  or	  wishful	  thinking.	  Therefore,	  Good	  is	  in	  a	  better	  epistemic	  position	  than	  Bad	  to	  satisfy	  the	  proper	  basing	  condition	  for	  doxastic	  justification.	  Good	  reasoning	  is	  crucial	  for	  satisfying	  both	  ideal	  and	  non-­‐ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality.	  If	  Good	  and	  Bad	  are	  non-­‐ideal	  agents,	  then	  neither	  is	  capable	  of	  reasoning	  well	  enough	  to	  satisfy	  ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality.	  Recall	  Christensen’s	  example:	  each	  of	  them	  has	  propositional	  justification	  to	  be	  certain	  that	  the	  theorem	  is	  true	  and	  hence	  to	  bet	  the	  house	  against	  a	  nickel	  in	  the	  certainty	  of	  winning.	  But	  neither	  can	  be	  certain	  of	  winning	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  doxastically	  justified,	  since	  neither	  has	  doxastic	  dispositions	  that	  are	  perfectly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  theorems	  and	  non-­‐theorems.	  Even	  so,	  there	  may	  be	  some	  high	  but	  less	  than	  maximal	  degree	  of	  confidence	  that	  is	  required	  by	  ordinary	  standards	  of	  rationality.	  And	  Good	  is	  in	  a	  better	  position	  than	  Bad	  to	  satisfy	  those	  ordinary	  standards	  of	  rationality	  since	  his	  doxastic	  dispositions	  are	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  theorems	  and	  non-­‐theorems.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  experience	  in	  the	  apriori	  domain	  is	  an	  
enabling	  role,	  rather	  than	  a	  justifying	  role:	  it	  is	  not	  a	  source	  of	  propositional	  justification	  to	  believe	  logical	  truths,	  but	  it	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  enabling	  subjects	  to	  use	  the	  propositional	  justification	  that	  they	  already	  have	  in	  forming	  doxastically	  justified	  beliefs.	  The	  distinction	  between	  enabling	  and	  justifying	  roles	  for	  experience	  is	  a	  familiar	  one:	  for	  instance,	  it	  is	  a	  routine	  point	  that	  color	  experience	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  enabling	  subjects	  to	  understand	  the	  proposition	  that	  
	   24	  
nothing	  can	  be	  red	  and	  green	  all	  over,	  without	  thereby	  providing	  the	  source	  of	  their	  justification	  to	  believe	  it.21	  But	  my	  proposal	  goes	  beyond	  this	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  the	  enabling	  role	  of	  experience	  encompasses	  not	  just	  perceptual	  experience,	  but	  also	  cognitive	  experience,	  including	  experiences	  of	  understanding,	  reasoning,	  and	  intuition.	  And	  second,	  the	  role	  of	  experience	  is	  not	  restricted	  to	  its	  role	  in	  enabling	  the	  grasp	  of	  propositions,	  but	  includes	  whatever	  else	  is	  needed	  to	  convert	  propositional	  justification	  into	  doxastic	  justification.	  The	  enabling	  role	  of	  experience	  includes	  much	  more	  on	  this	  view	  than	  is	  traditionally	  recognized.22	  	  
7. The	  Disabling	  Role	  of	  Experience	  Christensen	  (2007)	  argues	  that	  the	  requirement	  of	  logical	  omniscience	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  requirement	  to	  respect	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  one’s	  own	  cognitive	  imperfection.	  He	  gives	  the	  following	  example	  to	  illustrate	  the	  tension:	  	   Suppose	  I	  work	  out	  my	  proof	  of	  T	  after	  having	  coffee	  with	  my	  friend	  Jocko.	  Palms	  sweaty	  with	  the	  excitement	  of	  logical	  progress,	  I	  check	  my	  work	  several	  times,	  and	  decide	  that	  the	  proof	  is	  good.	  But	  then	  a	  trusted	  colleague	  walks	  in	  and	  tells	  me	  that	  Jocko	  has	  been	  surreptitiously	  slipping	  a	  reason-­‐distorting	  drug	  into	  people’s	  coffee	  –	  a	  drug	  whose	  effects	  include	  a	  strong	  propensity	  to	  reasoning	  errors	  in	  99%	  of	  those	  who	  have	  been	  dosed	  (1%	  of	  the	  population	  happen	  to	  be	  immune).	  He	  tells	  me	  that	  those	  who	  have	  been	  impaired	  do	  not	  notice	  any	  difficulties	  with	  their	  own	  cognition	  –	  they	  just	  make	  mistakes;	  indeed,	  the	  only	  change	  most	  of	  them	  notice	  is	  unusually	  sweaty	  palms.	  (2007:	  10)	  	  Christensen	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  rational	  to	  be	  certain	  that	  T	  is	  true	  only	  if	  it	  is	  also	  rational	  to	  be	  certain	  that	  E	  is	  false,	  where	  E	  is	  an	  error	  proposition	  that	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  See	  Burge	  (1993:	  460),	  BonJour	  (1998:	  9-­‐10)	  and	  Chalmers	  (2012:	  189-­‐90).	  22	  See	  Peacocke	  (2004:	  205-­‐7),	  Chalmers	  (2012:	  185-­‐98)	  and	  Ichikawa	  and	  Jarvis	  (2013:	  166-­‐70)	  for	  similarly	  expansive	  conceptions	  of	  the	  enabling	  role	  of	  experience,	  although	  none	  of	  them	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  endorse	  the	  claims	  about	  the	  disabling	  role	  of	  experience	  proposed	  in	  sections	  7	  and	  8.	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inconsistent	  with	  T:	  I	  falsely	  believe	  T	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  mistaken	  reasoning.	  Moreover,	  he	  continues,	  it	  is	  not	  rational	  to	  be	  certain	  that	  E	  is	  false	  given	  strong	  evidence	  that	  E	  is	  true	  in	  the	  form	  of	  testimony	  from	  a	  trusted	  colleague	  corroborated	  by	  an	  experience	  of	  unusually	  sweaty	  palms.	  Therefore,	  he	  concludes,	  it	  is	  not	  rational	  to	  be	  certain	  that	  T	  is	  true	  and	  so	  rationality	  does	  not	  require	  logical	  omniscience.	  Notoriously,	  of	  course,	  one	  philosopher’s	  modus	  tollens	  is	  another	  philosopher’s	  modus	  ponens.	  So	  one	  might	  insist	  that	  since	  it	  is	  rational	  to	  be	  certain	  that	  T	  is	  true,	  it	  is	  also	  rational	  to	  be	  certain	  that	  E	  is	  false.	  But	  Christensen	  has	  a	  compelling	  reply:	  it	  would	  be	  irrational	  and	  dogmatic	  for	  you	  or	  me	  to	  disregard	  evidence	  of	  our	  cognitive	  imperfections	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  following	  Certainty	  Argument:	  	   (1) It	  is	  certain	  that	  T	  is	  true.	  (2) If	  it	  is	  certain	  that	  T	  is	  true,	  then	  it	  is	  certain	  E	  is	  false.	  (3) Therefore,	  it	  is	  certain	  that	  E	  is	  false.	  	  I	  agree	  with	  Christensen	  that	  there	  is	  something	  wrong	  with	  using	  the	  Certainty	  Argument	  in	  this	  way,	  but	  I	  disagree	  about	  what	  exactly	  is	  wrong	  with	  it.	  Christensen’s	  view	  is	  that	  evidence	  of	  one’s	  cognitive	  imperfection	  functions	  as	  a	  propositional	  defeater	  –	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  defeats	  one’s	  propositional	  justification	  to	  be	  certain	  of	  logical	  truths.23	  In	  the	  Jocko	  case,	  for	  example,	  one’s	  evidence	  that	  E	  is	  true	  defeats	  one’s	  propositional	  justification	  to	  be	  certain	  that	  T	  is	  true.	  On	  this	  view,	  what’s	  wrong	  with	  the	  Certainty	  Argument	  is	  that	  evidence	  that	  justifies	  doubts	  about	  its	  conclusion	  thereby	  defeats	  one’s	  justification	  to	  be	  certain	  of	  its	  premises.	  I	  cannot	  accept	  this	  account	  since	  I	  maintain	  that	  apriori	  logical	  justification	  is	  indefeasible:	  one’s	  apriori	  justification	  to	  be	  certain	  that	  T	  is	  true	  defeats	  one’s	  aposteriori	  justification	  for	  positive	  credence	  that	  E	  is	  true,	  rather	  than	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  See	  also	  Feldman	  (2005),	  Christensen	  (2010),	  and	  Kelly	  (2010),	  although	  all	  of	  these	  authors	  acknowledge	  that	  evidence	  of	  one’s	  cognitive	  imperfection	  is	  in	  some	  respects	  different	  from	  more	  standard	  examples	  of	  undercutting	  defeaters.	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vice	  versa.	  So	  the	  challenge	  for	  me	  is	  to	  give	  an	  alternative	  account	  of	  what’s	  wrong	  with	  using	  the	  Certainty	  Argument.	  I	  claim	  that	  evidence	  of	  one’s	  cognitive	  imperfection	  functions	  as	  a	  doxastic	  
defeater,	  rather	  than	  a	  propositional	  defeater	  –	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  does	  not	  defeat	  one’s	  propositional	  justification	  to	  be	  certain	  that	  T	  is	  true,	  and	  hence	  that	  E	  is	  false,	  but	  merely	  prevents	  one	  from	  converting	  this	  propositional	  justification	  into	  doxastic	  justification.	  On	  this	  view,	  what’s	  wrong	  with	  using	  the	  Certainty	  Argument	  is	  that	  although	  one	  has	  propositional	  justification	  to	  be	  certain	  that	  T	  is	  true,	  and	  hence	  that	  E	  is	  false,	  one	  is	  nevertheless	  disabled	  from	  being	  certain	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  doxastically	  justified.	  As	  a	  result,	  one	  cannot	  use	  the	  Certainty	  Argument	  to	  assuage	  doubts	  about	  its	  conclusion.24	  On	  this	  account,	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  experience	  in	  the	  logical	  domain	  is	  not	  a	  justifying	  and	  defeating	  role,	  but	  rather	  an	  enabling	  and	  disabling	  role.	  Just	  as	  experience	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  enabling	  us	  to	  convert	  propositional	  justification	  into	  doxastic	  justification,	  so	  it	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  disabling	  us	  from	  doing	  so.	  But	  this	  proposal	  about	  the	  role	  of	  experience	  applies	  only	  to	  non-­‐ideally	  rational	  agents	  like	  you	  and	  me.	  (I	  defer	  discussion	  of	  ideally	  rational	  agents	  until	  section	  8.)	  Empirical	  evidence	  of	  one’s	  cognitive	  imperfection	  has	  a	  disabling	  effect	  on	  non-­‐ideally	  rational	  agents	  because	  their	  doxastic	  dispositions	  are	  not	  sufficiently	  sensitive	  to	  the	  logical	  facts.	  If	  I	  use	  the	  Certainty	  Argument	  in	  becoming	  certain	  that	  E	  is	  false,	  then	  my	  belief	  is	  doxastically	  unjustified	  since	  it	  is	  held	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  doxastic	  dispositions	  that	  are	  not	  appropriately	  sensitive	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  “the	  good	  case”	  in	  which	  I	  correctly	  prove	  a	  theorem	  and	  “the	  bad	  case”	  in	  which	  I	  make	  a	  mistake.	  Exercising	  the	  same	  doxastic	  dispositions	  in	  response	  to	  the	  same	  empirical	  evidence	  could	  easily	  yield	  the	  false	  and	  unjustified	  belief	  that	  I	  correctly	  proved	  the	  theorem	  when	  in	  fact	  I	  didn’t.	  As	  a	  result,	  I	  do	  not	  satisfy	  the	  proper	  basing	  condition	  for	  doxastic	  justification	  as	  explained	  in	  section	  6.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Compare	  Pryor’s	  (2004)	  account	  of	  what’s	  wrong	  with	  Moore’s	  argument	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  external	  world.	  According	  to	  Pryor,	  there	  is	  nothing	  wrong	  with	  the	  justificatory	  structure	  of	  the	  argument,	  although	  there	  are	  limits	  on	  its	  dialectical	  effectiveness:	  “Anyone	  who	  had	  doubts	  about	  its	  conclusion	  couldn’t	  use	  the	  argument	  to	  rationally	  overcome	  those	  doubts”	  (2004:	  363).	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We	  can	  distinguish	  two	  aspects	  of	  the	  function	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  one’s	  own	  cognitive	  imperfection.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  disables	  non-­‐ideal	  agents	  from	  complying	  with	  ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  has	  an	  effect	  on	  what	  is	  required	  for	  complying	  with	  non-­‐ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality.	  Even	  if	  I	  cannot	  be	  certain	  of	  logical	  truths	  in	  a	  way	  that	  meets	  ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality,	  I	  can	  be	  more	  or	  less	  confident	  of	  such	  truths	  in	  ways	  that	  meet	  ordinary	  standards	  of	  rationality.	  But	  evidence	  of	  one’s	  cognitive	  imperfection	  impacts	  on	  how	  much	  confidence	  is	  required	  by	  ordinary	  standards	  of	  rationality.	  In	  particular,	  evidence	  that	  I’ve	  ingested	  a	  reason-­‐distorting	  drug	  increases	  the	  degree	  of	  confidence	  that	  is	  non-­‐ideally	  reasonable	  to	  invest	  in	  E	  and	  thereby	  reduces	  the	  degree	  of	  confidence	  that	  is	  non-­‐ideally	  reasonable	  to	  invest	  in	  T.	  Two	  non-­‐ideal	  agents	  might	  be	  equally	  reliable	  in	  reasoning	  about	  logic,	  but	  if	  one	  of	  them	  acquires	  evidence	  that	  she	  has	  ingested	  a	  reason-­‐distorting	  drug,	  then	  it	  is	  reasonable	  by	  non-­‐ideal	  standards	  for	  her	  to	  invest	  less	  confidence	  in	  T.	  How	  much	  confidence	  it	  is	  non-­‐ideally	  reasonable	  to	  invest	  in	  logical	  truths	  depends	  not	  just	  on	  one’s	  degree	  of	  cognitive	  imperfection	  but	  also	  on	  the	  state	  of	  one’s	  evidence	  about	  one’s	  cognitive	  imperfection.25	  How	  does	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  one’s	  cognitive	  imperfection	  affect	  which	  attitudes	  are	  required	  by	  non-­‐ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality?	  In	  section	  5,	  I	  proposed	  that	  the	  option	  required	  by	  non-­‐ideal	  standards	  of	  rationality	  is	  the	  best	  option	  in	  the	  ideal	  ranking	  that	  the	  agent	  can	  take	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sufficiently	  good	  reasoning.	  But	  misleading	  evidence	  about	  your	  cognitive	  imperfection	  impacts	  neither	  the	  actual	  quality	  of	  our	  first-­‐order	  reasoning	  nor	  the	  ideal	  ranking	  of	  options.	  So	  there	  is	  something	  of	  a	  puzzle	  here.	  My	  response	  is	  that	  acquiring	  evidence	  about	  our	  cognitive	  imperfection	  brings	  new	  reasoning	  dispositions	  into	  play	  and	  so	  it	  does	  impact	  on	  the	  overall	  quality	  of	  our	  reasoning.	  We	  need	  to	  consider	  not	  just	  your	  first-­‐order	  dispositions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  This	  account	  of	  the	  function	  of	  evidence	  of	  one’s	  cognitive	  imperfection	  has	  more	  general	  implications	  for	  debates	  about	  the	  epistemic	  significance	  of	  disagreement,	  but	  I	  do	  not	  have	  space	  to	  explore	  them	  here.	  See	  van	  Wietmarschen	  (2013)	  for	  an	  account	  that	  is	  broadly	  congenial	  to	  mine.	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to	  reason	  about	  logic,	  but	  also	  your	  second-­‐order	  dispositions	  to	  respond	  to	  evidence	  of	  your	  own	  cognitive	  imperfection.	  Your	  first-­‐order	  reasoning	  is	  reliable	  enough	  to	  make	  high	  credence	  rational	  in	  ordinary	  contexts,	  but	  your	  second-­‐order	  dispositions	  to	  respond	  to	  evidence	  of	  your	  cognitive	  imperfection	  are	  unreliable	  enough	  to	  make	  high	  credence	  irrational	  in	  contexts	  where	  you	  have	  such	  evidence.	  That	  is	  why	  misleading	  evidence	  of	  one’s	  cognitive	  imperfection	  can	  reduce	  the	  credence	  that	  is	  required	  by	  ordinary	  standards	  of	  rationality.	  	  
8. Ideally	  Rational	  Agents	  The	  account	  of	  the	  disabling	  role	  of	  experience	  proposed	  in	  section	  7	  does	  not	  extend	  from	  non-­‐ideally	  rational	  agents	  (NRAs)	  to	  ideally	  rational	  agents	  (IRAs).	  Empirical	  evidence	  of	  one’s	  cognitive	  imperfection	  plays	  a	  disabling	  role	  for	  NRAs	  because	  our	  logical	  reasoning	  is	  not	  good	  enough:	  our	  doxastic	  dispositions	  are	  not	  sufficiently	  sensitive	  to	  the	  logical	  facts.	  This	  is	  why	  it	  seems	  irrational	  and	  dogmatic	  for	  non-­‐ideal	  agents	  like	  us	  to	  use	  the	  Certainty	  Argument	  because	  we’re	  disposed	  to	  use	  the	  same	  reasoning	  for	  logical	  truths	  and	  falsehoods	  alike.	  IRAs	  are	  immune	  from	  these	  disabling	  effects,	  since	  their	  logical	  reasoning	  is	  perfectly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  logical	  facts.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  an	  IRA	  can	  acquire	  misleading	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  she	  is	  cognitively	  imperfect.	  Nor	  is	  it	  to	  claim	  that	  she	  can	  simply	  ignore	  it.	  The	  claim	  is	  rather	  that	  an	  IRA	  can	  use	  the	  Certainty	  Argument	  in	  coming	  to	  know	  with	  certainty	  that	  an	  error	  proposition	  is	  false	  when	  it	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  apriori	  truths	  of	  logic.	  An	  IRA,	  unlike	  an	  NRA,	  is	  not	  disposed	  to	  use	  the	  same	  reasoning	  for	  logical	  truths	  and	  falsehoods	  alike	  because	  her	  logical	  reasoning	  is	  perfectly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  logical	  facts.	  Does	  this	  mean	  IRAs	  are	  immune	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  reason-­‐distorting	  drugs?	  This	  would	  be	  surprising,	  since	  having	  an	  iron	  constitution	  is	  not	  a	  plausible	  condition	  for	  ideal	  rationality.	  Better	  to	  say	  that	  IRAs	  can	  be	  drugged,	  but	  the	  effect	  of	  these	  drugs	  is	  to	  change	  their	  doxastic	  dispositions	  and	  thereby	  to	  make	  them	  non-­‐ideal.	  We	  needn’t	  accept	  the	  principle,	  “Once	  an	  IRA,	  always	  an	  IRA.”	  One	  could	  be	  ideal	  at	  one	  time	  and	  non-­‐ideal	  at	  another.	  Indeed,	  one	  could	  be	  ideal	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  one	  is	  in	  danger	  of	  becoming	  non-­‐ideal.	  The	  danger	  of	  becoming	  non-­‐ideal	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does	  not	  thereby	  make	  one	  non-­‐ideal	  any	  more	  than	  the	  danger	  of	  becoming	  insane	  thereby	  makes	  one	  insane.	  One’s	  first-­‐order	  reasoning	  dispositions	  may	  be	  perfectly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  logical	  facts	  even	  if	  one	  has	  a	  second-­‐order	  disposition	  to	  acquire	  first-­‐order	  reasoning	  dispositions	  that	  are	  imperfectly	  sensitive	  –	  say,	  because	  one	  is	  in	  danger	  of	  ingesting	  Christensen’s	  reason-­‐distorting	  drugs	  or	  inhaling	  Hawthorne’s	  “apriori	  gas”.26	  Does	  this	  mean	  IRAs	  are	  certain	  of	  their	  own	  cognitive	  perfection?	  This	  would	  be	  surprising	  too,	  since	  empirical	  knowledge	  about	  one’s	  own	  reasoning	  dispositions	  is	  not	  a	  plausible	  condition	  for	  ideal	  rationality.	  Christensen	  puts	  the	  objection	  as	  follows:	  	   An	  IRA,	  as	  usually	  conceived	  of	  in	  theorizing	  about	  rationality,	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  an	  omniscient	  god.	  The	  IRA	  reasons	  perfectly,	  and	  is	  thus	  logically	  omniscient…,	  but	  the	  IRA	  is	  not	  assumed	  to	  be	  factually	  omniscient.	  This	  conception	  of	  an	  IRA	  carries	  with	  it	  no	  obvious	  presumption	  that	  an	  IRA	  would	  know	  that	  she	  was	  ideally	  rational.	  (2007:	  14)	  	  IRAs	  need	  not	  be	  certain	  of	  their	  own	  cognitive	  perfection	  at	  past	  or	  future	  times,	  since	  an	  agent	  can	  be	  ideal	  at	  one	  time	  and	  non-­‐ideal	  at	  another.	  Moreover,	  an	  IRA	  need	  not	  be	  rationally	  certain	  of	  her	  own	  cognitive	  perfection	  at	  the	  present	  time,	  so	  long	  as	  she	  is	  rationally	  certain	  of	  any	  logical	  truth	  T	  and	  hence	  certain	  of	  the	  falsehood	  of	  any	  error	  proposition	  E	  that	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  T.	  Christensen	  observes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  bootstrapping	  problem	  here.	  If	  an	  IRA	  can	  be	  rationally	  certain	  that	  T	  is	  true,	  and	  hence	  that	  E	  is	  false,	  then	  she	  can	  repeat	  this	  performance	  for	  a	  whole	  series	  of	  logical	  truths.	  Indeed,	  if	  an	  IRA	  is	  cognitively	  unlimited,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  limit	  to	  the	  number	  of	  logical	  truths	  for	  which	  she	  can	  repeat	  this	  performance;	  in	  principle,	  she	  can	  do	  it	  for	  all	  of	  them.	  And	  so,	  if	  an	  IRA	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Hawthorne	  (2007)	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  “apriori	  gas”	  to	  argue	  that	  apriori	  knowledge	  does	  not	  supervene	  on	  one’s	  intrinsic	  properties	  given	  a	  safety	  condition	  for	  knowledge.	  However,	  the	  safety	  condition	  is	  not	  violated	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  apriori	  gas	  so	  long	  as	  it	  is	  formulated	  in	  a	  basis-­‐sensitive	  way.	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can	  be	  rationally	  certain	  about	  what	  her	  doxastic	  attitudes	  are	  at	  any	  given	  time,	  then	  she	  can	  also	  become	  rationally	  certain	  that	  she	  satisfies	  the	  requirements	  of	  ideal	  rationality:	  for	  any	  logical	  truth,	  she	  is	  certain	  that	  it	  is	  true.	  Doesn’t	  it	  follow	  that	  an	  IRA	  must	  be	  certain	  of	  her	  own	  cognitive	  perfection?	  Not	  quite.	  An	  IRA	  does	  not	  just	  hold	  all	  the	  doxastic	  attitudes	  that	  she	  has	  propositional	  justification	  to	  hold;	  she	  also	  holds	  them	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  doxastically	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perfectly	  good	  reasoning.	  Even	  if	  an	  IRA	  can	  be	  certain	  that	  she	  satisfies	  the	  first	  condition,	  she	  cannot	  be	  certain	  that	  she	  satisfies	  the	  second.	  At	  best,	  the	  Certainty	  Argument	  delivers	  the	  conclusion	  that,	  for	  every	  logical	  truth,	  she	  is	  certain	  that	  it	  is	  true	  and	  so	  she	  holds	  the	  doxastic	  attitude	  that	  she	  has	  propositional	  justification	  to	  hold.	  It	  does	  not	  deliver	  the	  conclusion	  that	  her	  doxastic	  attitude	  is	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perfectly	  good	  reasoning.	  An	  IRA	  must	  be	  certain	  of	  the	  facts	  about	  propositional	  justification,	  but	  she	  need	  not	  be	  certain	  of	  the	  facts	  about	  doxastic	  justification,	  since	  she	  can	  have	  rational	  doubts	  about	  the	  reasoning	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  her	  beliefs	  are	  held.27	  	  The	  upshot	  is	  that	  ideal	  rationality	  is	  consistent	  with	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  Moorean	  predicament.	  Consider	  the	  pair	  of	  Moorean	  conjunctions	  below:	  	  
Malignant:	  T	  and	  I	  don’t	  have	  [propositional]	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  T.	  
Benign:	  T	  and	  I	  don’t	  believe	  that	  T	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  [doxastically]	  justified.	  	  I	  have	  argued	  (in	  Smithies	  2012c)	  that	  one	  cannot	  have	  evidence	  that	  justifies	  believing	  Moorean	  conjunctions	  of	  the	  malignant	  form.	  But	  one	  can	  certainly	  have	  evidence	  that	  justifies	  believing	  Moorean	  conjunctions	  of	  the	  benign	  form.	  Suppose	  one	  has	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  a	  demon	  has	  debased	  one’s	  beliefs	  without	  disturbing	  the	  match	  between	  one’s	  beliefs	  and	  the	  justifying	  evidence.28	  In	  that	  case,	  there	  is	  no	  rational	  pressure	  to	  revise	  one’s	  beliefs.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  This	  fits	  with	  a	  version	  of	  access	  internalism	  on	  which	  propositional	  justification	  but	  not	  doxastic	  justification	  is	  accessible	  by	  reflection	  alone.	  See	  Smithies	  (2012c).	  28	  See	  Schaffer	  (2010)	  for	  the	  debasing	  demon.	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An	  IRA	  can	  be	  in	  just	  this	  kind	  of	  benign	  Moorean	  predicament.	  Suppose	  she	  has	  convincing	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  she	  has	  taken	  a	  reason-­‐distorting	  drug	  that	  causes	  reasoning	  errors	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  and	  that	  she	  is	  not	  immune	  from	  its	  effects.	  The	  most	  probable	  hypothesis	  given	  her	  total	  evidence	  is	  perhaps	  that	  she	  made	  an	  error	  in	  reasoning	  that	  leads	  to	  a	  true	  and	  certain	  conclusion.	  In	  that	  case,	  rationality	  requires	  that	  she	  doubt	  the	  quality	  of	  her	  reasoning,	  but	  since	  she	  is	  certain	  that	  her	  conclusion	  is	  true,	  there	  is	  no	  rational	  pressure	  to	  change	  her	  view.	  So,	  she	  is	  required	  to	  believe	  the	  benign	  Moorean	  conjunction,	  “It	  is	  certain	  that	  T,	  but	  I	  am	  not	  certain	  that	  T	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  justified.”	  	  
9. Rational	  Dilemmas	  The	  arguments	  of	  this	  paper	  have	  more	  general	  implications	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  rational	  dilemmas.	  Christensen	  argues	  that	  evidence	  about	  one’s	  own	  cognitive	  imperfection	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  following	  rational	  ideals:	  	   (1) (LOGIC)	  An	  agent’s	  beliefs	  must	  respect	  logic	  by	  satisfying	  (some	  version	  of)	  probabilistic	  coherence.	  (2) (EVIDENCE)	  An	  agent’s	  beliefs	  (at	  least	  about	  logically	  contingent	  matters)	  must	  be	  proportioned	  to	  the	  agent’s	  evidence.	  (3) (INTEGRATION)	  An	  agent’s	  object-­‐level	  beliefs	  must	  reflect	  the	  agent’s	  meta-­‐level	  beliefs	  about	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  cognitive	  processes	  underlying	  her	  object-­‐level	  beliefs.	  (2007:	  20)	  	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  an	  agent	  whose	  first-­‐order	  beliefs	  respect	  (LOGIC)	  but	  whose	  second-­‐order	  beliefs	  about	  her	  own	  cognitive	  imperfections	  respect	  (EVIDENCE)	  thereby	  fails	  to	  exhibit	  the	  kind	  of	  inter-­‐level	  coherence	  that	  is	  required	  by	  (INTEGRATION).	  So,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  satisfy	  all	  three	  ideals	  given	  evidence	  of	  one’s	  own	  cognitive	  imperfection.	  Christensen	  articulates	  the	  point	  as	  an	  epistemic	  analogue	  of	  Murphy’s	  Law:	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The	  usual	  version	  of	  Murphy’s	  Law	  states	  that	  if	  it’s	  possible	  for	  something	  to	  go	  wrong,	  it	  will.	  The	  epistemic	  cousin	  says	  that	  if	  it’s	  possible	  that	  something	  has	  gone	  epistemically	  wrong	  (more	  specifically,	  if	  it’s	  possible	  that	  I’ve	  made	  a	  mistake	  in	  thinking	  about	  some	  theorem	  T),	  then	  something	  has	  actually	  gone	  epistemically	  wrong	  (my	  belief	  about	  T	  falls	  short	  of	  some	  rational	  ideal).	  For	  either	  I’m	  certain	  of	  T,	  in	  which	  case	  my	  belief	  fails	  to	  reflect	  appropriately	  the	  possibility	  that	  I’ve	  made	  a	  cognitive	  error,	  or	  I’m	  uncertain	  about	  T,	  in	  which	  case	  my	  belief	  fails	  to	  respect	  logic.	  (2007:	  24-­‐5)	  	  Nevertheless,	  Christensen	  argues,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  think	  that	  these	  are	  not	  all	  genuine	  rational	  ideals.	  Here	  is	  Christensen’s	  diagnosis:	  	  	   We’re	  quite	  familiar	  with	  other	  ideals	  that	  operate	  as	  values	  to	  be	  maximized,	  yet	  whose	  maximization	  must	  in	  certain	  cases	  be	  balanced	  against,	  or	  otherwise	  constrained	  by,	  other	  values….	  [T]he	  fact	  that	  ideals	  can	  be	  in	  tension	  with	  one	  another	  does	  not	  undermine	  their	  status	  as	  ideals.	  So	  we	  can	  still	  see	  (LOGIC)	  as	  a	  rational	  ideal	  once	  we	  see	  how	  it	  is	  to	  be	  constrained	  by	  (EVIDENCE)	  and	  (INTEGRATION).	  (2007:	  24)	  	  On	  this	  view,	  a	  probabilistically	  coherent	  agent	  would	  not	  be	  ideally	  rational,	  since	  this	  means	  violating	  other	  rational	  ideals	  –	  namely,	  (EVIDENCE)	  or	  (INTEGRATION).	  Nevertheless,	  it	  can	  be	  useful	  to	  think	  of	  a	  probabilistically	  coherent	  agent	  as	  maximizing	  one	  dimension	  of	  ideal	  rationality	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  weighed	  against	  others.29	  On	  this	  view,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  distinct	  rational	  ideals,	  each	  of	  which	  captures	  some	  dimension	  of	  ideal	  rationality,	  but	  none	  of	  which	  can	  be	  maximized	  without	  thereby	  sacrificing	  others.	  So,	  on	  this	  view,	  there	  cannot	  be	  an	  agent	  that	  maximizes	  all	  dimensions	  of	  ideal	  rationality;	  the	  best	  we	  can	  hope	  for	  from	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Compare	  Chalmers’s	  (2012:	  101-­‐7)	  response	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  self-­‐doubt	  by	  postulating	  ideal	  insulated	  cognizers:	  “cognizers	  whose	  rational	  processes	  are	  practically	  insulated	  from	  higher-­‐order	  beliefs…but	  otherwise	  ideal.”	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ideally	  rational	  agent	  is	  some	  maximally	  good	  way	  of	  weighing	  these	  competing	  dimensions	  against	  one	  another.30	  My	  arguments	  in	  this	  paper	  make	  available	  an	  alternative	  diagnosis	  on	  which	  there	  is	  no	  inherent	  tension	  between	  these	  dimensions	  of	  ideal	  rationality.	  On	  this	  diagnosis,	  Murphy’s	  Law	  applies	  to	  non-­‐ideal	  agents,	  but	  not	  ideally	  rational	  agents.	  Ideally	  rational	  agents	  are	  capable	  of	  maximizing	  (LOGIC),	  (EVIDENCE),	  and	  (INTEGRATION),	  whereas	  non-­‐ideally	  rational	  agents	  are	  incapable	  of	  doing	  so.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  tension	  between	  these	  various	  dimensions	  of	  ideal	  rationality	  is	  not	  inherent	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  ideal	  rationality	  itself,	  but	  is	  rather	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  plight	  of	  non-­‐ideal	  agents.	  Given	  our	  fallen	  state,	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  trade	  off	  certain	  dimensions	  of	  ideal	  rationality	  against	  others	  and	  there	  may	  be	  some	  degree	  of	  incommensurability	  in	  determining	  which	  trade	  offs	  are	  best	  for	  us	  to	  make.	  But	  this	  is	  no	  reflection	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  ideal	  rationality	  itself.	  	  
10. Conclusions	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  have	  argued	  for	  the	  following	  claims.	  First,	  a	  negative	  thesis	  about	  the	  source	  of	  apriori	  logical	  justification:	  it	  does	  not	  have	  its	  source	  in	  facts	  about	  one’s	  experience.	  Second,	  a	  positive	  thesis	  about	  the	  source	  of	  apriori	  logical	  justification:	  it	  has	  its	  source	  in	  the	  logical	  facts	  that	  one	  has	  apriori	  justification	  to	  believe.	  Third,	  a	  thesis	  about	  the	  enabling	  role	  of	  experience	  in	  the	  logical	  domain:	  it	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  enabling	  subjects	  to	  convert	  propositional	  justification	  into	  doxastic	  justification.	  Fourth,	  a	  thesis	  about	  the	  disabling	  role	  of	  experience	  in	  the	  logical	  domain:	  it	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  disabling	  subjects	  from	  converting	  propositional	  justification	  into	  doxastic	  justification.	  Fifth,	  a	  thesis	  about	  ideally	  rational	  agents:	  they	  are	  immune	  from	  the	  disabling	  role	  of	  experience	  in	  the	  logical	  domain.	  Sixth,	  a	  thesis	  about	  the	  structure	  of	  rationality:	  there	  are	  no	  rational	  dilemmas	  that	  result	  from	  conflicts	  between	  first-­‐order	  evidence	  and	  higher-­‐order	  evidence.	  Finally,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  See	  Lasonen-­‐Aarnio	  (2014)	  for	  criticism	  of	  this	  proposal.	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paper	  as	  a	  whole	  provides	  a	  strategy	  for	  motivating	  and	  defending	  the	  thesis	  that	  ideal	  rationality	  requires	  omniscience	  and	  infallibility	  about	  logic.31	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  audiences	  in	  2012	  and	  2013	  at	  Ohio	  State,	  Cologne,	  Oxford,	  Aberdeen,	  and	  MIT	  for	  feedback	  on	  this	  paper.	  Many	  thanks	  especially	  to	  Magdalena	  Balcerak	  Jackson,	  Albert	  Casullo,	  David	  Chalmers,	  David	  Christensen,	  Jeremy	  Fantl,	  John	  Hawthorne,	  Brian	  Hedden,	  Sophie	  Horowitz,	  Jonathan	  Ichikawa,	  Carrie	  Jenkins,	  Brian	  Kim,	  Chris	  Pincock,	  Bernhard	  Salow,	  Miriam	  Schoenfield,	  Jack	  Spencer,	  Roger	  White,	  Crispin	  Wright,	  and	  the	  referees	  for	  Synthese.	  The	  Templeton	  Foundation	  supported	  work	  on	  this	  paper	  during	  a	  visit	  to	  Oxford	  University	  in	  Trinity	  2013.	  
	   35	  
References	  Alston,	  W.	  1971.	  Varieties	  of	  Privileged	  Access.	  American	  Philosophical	  Quarterly	  8.3:	  223-­‐41.	  Alston,	  W.	  1988.	  The	  Deontological	  Conception	  of	  Epistemic	  Justification.	  
Philosophical	  Perspectives	  2:	  257-­‐99.	  Bengson,	  J.	  Forthcoming.	  The	  Intellectual	  Given.	  Mind.	  Boghossian,	  P.	  2000.	  Knowledge	  of	  Logic.	  In	  New	  Essays	  on	  the	  Apriori,	  edited	  by	  P.	  Boghossian	  &	  C.	  Peacocke.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  BonJour,	  L.	  1998.	  In	  Defense	  of	  Pure	  Reason.	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Burge,	  T.	  1993.	  Content	  Preservation.	  Philosophical	  Review	  102.4:	  457-­‐88.	  Burge,	  T.	  1998.	  Frege	  on	  Knowing	  the	  Foundation.	  Mind	  107:	  305-­‐47.	  Casullo,	  A.	  2003.	  A	  Priori	  Justification.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Chalmers,	  D.	  2011.	  The	  Nature	  of	  Epistemic	  Space.	  In	  Epistemic	  Modality,	  edited	  by	  A.	  Egan	  &	  B.	  Weatherson.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Chalmers,	  D.	  2012.	  Constructing	  the	  World.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Christensen,	  D.	  2004.	  Putting	  Logic	  in	  Its	  Place.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Christensen,	  D.	  2007.	  Does	  Murphy’s	  Law	  Apply	  in	  Epistemology?	  Self-­‐Doubt	  and	  Rational	  Ideals.	  Oxford	  Studies	  in	  Epistemology	  2:	  3-­‐31.	  Christensen,	  D.	  2010.	  Higher-­‐Order	  Evidence.	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  
Research	  81.1:	  185-­‐215.	  Chudnoff,	  E.	  2013.	  Intuition.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Feldman,	  R.	  and	  Conee,	  E.	  1985.	  Evidentialism.	  Philosophical	  Studies	  48.1:	  15-­‐34.	  Feldman,	  R.	  2000.	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Belief.	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research	  60.3:	  667-­‐695.	  Feldman,	  R.	  2005.	  Respecting	  the	  Evidence.	  Philosophical	  Perspectives	  19:	  95-­‐119.	  Foley,	  R.	  1993.	  Working	  Without	  a	  Net:	  A	  Study	  of	  Egocentric	  Epistemology.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Hajek,	  A.	  MS.	  Staying	  Regular.	  Hawthorne,	  J.	  2002.	  Deeply	  Contingent	  A	  Priori	  Knowledge.	  Philosophy	  and	  
Phenomenological	  Research	  65.2:	  247-­‐69.	  
	   36	  
Hawthorne,	  J.	  2007.	  Apriority	  and	  Externalism.	  In	  Internalism	  and	  Externalism	  in	  
Semantics	  and	  Epistemology,	  edited	  by	  S.	  Goldberg.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Huemer,	  M.	  2001.	  Skepticism	  and	  the	  Veil	  of	  Perception.	  Rowman	  and	  Littlefield.	  Ichikawa,	  J.	  and	  Jarvis,	  B.	  2013.	  The	  Rules	  of	  Thought.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Kahneman,	  D.,	  Slovic,	  T.,	  and	  Tversky,	  A.	  1982.	  Judgment	  Under	  Uncertainty:	  
Heuristics	  and	  Biases.	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Kelly,	  T.	  2010.	  Peer	  Disagreement	  and	  Higher-­‐Order	  Evidence.	  In	  Disagreement,	  edited	  by	  R.	  Feldman	  &	  T.	  Warfield.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Kratzer,	  A.	  1981.	  The	  Notional	  Category	  of	  Modality.	  In	  Words,	  Worlds,	  and	  Contexts,	  edited	  by	  H.	  Eikmeyer	  and	  H.	  Rieser.	  De	  Gruyter.	  Kvanvig,	  J.	  and	  Menzel,	  C.	  1990.	  The	  Basic	  Notion	  of	  Justification.	  Philosophical	  
Studies	  59:	  235-­‐61.	  Lasonen	  Aarnio,	  M.	  2014.	  Higher-­‐Order	  Evidence	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Defeat.	  
Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research	  88.2:	  314-­‐45.	  Peacocke,	  C.	  2004.	  The	  Realm	  of	  Reason.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Pryor,	  J.	  2001.	  Highlights	  of	  Recent	  Epistemology.	  British	  Journal	  for	  the	  Philosophy	  
of	  Science	  52:	  95-­‐124.	  Pryor,	  J.	  2004.	  What’s	  Wrong	  With	  Moore’s	  Argument?	  Philosophical	  Issues	  14.1:	  349-­‐78.	  Schaffer,	  J.	  2010.	  The	  Debasing	  Demon.	  Analysis	  70.2:	  228-­‐37.	  Schoenfield,	  M.	  2012.	  Chilling	  Out	  On	  Epistemic	  Rationality.	  Philosophical	  Studies	  158.2:	  197-­‐219.	  Schoenfield,	  M.	  MS.	  Bridging	  Rationality	  and	  Accuracy.	  Smithies,	  D.	  2012a.	  The	  Simple	  Theory	  of	  Introspection.	  In	  D.	  Smithies	  and	  D.	  Stoljar,	  
Introspection	  and	  Consciousness.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Smithies,	  D.	  2012b.	  Mentalism	  and	  Epistemic	  Transparency.	  Australasian	  Journal	  of	  
Philosophy	  90.4:	  723-­‐41.	  Smithies,	  D.	  2012c.	  Moore’s	  Paradox	  and	  the	  Accessibility	  of	  Justification.	  Philosophy	  
and	  Phenomenological	  Research	  85.2:	  273-­‐300.	  Sosa,	  E.	  2003.	  Privileged	  Access.	  In	  Consciousness:	  New	  Philosophical	  Perspectives,	  edited	  by	  Q.	  Smith	  &	  A.	  Jokic.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
	   37	  
Titelbaum,	  M.	  Forthcoming.	  Rationality’s	  Fixed	  Point.	  Oxford	  Studies	  in	  Epistemology.	  Turri,	  J.	  2010.	  On	  the	  Relationship	  Between	  Propositional	  and	  Doxastic	  Justification.	  
Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research	  80.2:	  312-­‐26.	  Van	  Wietmarschen,	  H.	  2013.	  Peer	  Disagreement,	  Evidence,	  and	  Well	  Groundedness.	  
Philosophical	  Review	  122.3:	  395-­‐425.	  Watson,	  G.	  1975.	  Free	  Agency.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  72:	  205-­‐20.	  Williamson,	  T.	  2007.	  On	  Being	  Justified	  in	  One’s	  Head.	  In	  M.	  Timmons,	  J.	  Greco,	  and	  A.	  Mele,	  Rationality	  and	  the	  Good.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
